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ABSTRACT
Currently, two main approaches exist for improving the human-machine interface component of a
system in order to improve overall system performance—display enhancement and intelligent
decision-aiding. Each of these two approaches has its own set of advantages and disadvantages,
as well as introduce its own set of additional performance problems. These characteristics should
help identify which types of problem situations and domains are better aided by which type of
strategy. This report first describes the characteristic issues of these two decision-aiding strategies.
Then differences in expert and novice decision-making are described in order to help determine
whether a particular strategy may be better for a particular type of user. Finally, research is
outlined to compare and contrast the two technologies, as well as to examine the interaction effects
introduced by the different skill levels and the different methods for training operators.
Introduction
Currently, two main approaches exist for improving the human-machine interface
component of a system in order to improve overall system performance—display enhancement and
intelligent decision-aiding. These two approaches stem from the two main ways in which to aid
human performance. People can be aided in what they perceive (by making important information
more easily identified) as is the chief concern of display enhancement, or they can be aided in what
they do with the information they perceive (making it easier to perform operations, etc.) which is a
goal of intelligent decision-aiding.
These two technologies have their own sets of advantages and disadvantages, as well as
introduce their own sets of error modes (or new performance problems). Each approach has
characteristics which should help determine which problem situations are better handled by one
than the other, as well as what type of user (in terms of amount of experience) is better aided by
which type of human-machine interaction.
This research intends to compare and contrast these two technologies—display
enhancement and intelligent decision-aiding—to determine which types of human-machine systems
are better improved by each. Specifically, the domain examined here is a complex, dynamic
decision-making task, but it is hoped that a thorough study will lead to conclusions which can be
made about other domains as well. A look will also be taken to determine if different skill levels of
users are aided in different ways by these two approaches. Also, the possible error modes
introduced by each type of aiding will be examined.
This report is divided into five main sections. The first section will examine the
characteristic issues of intelligent decision aids, as well as determine the possible error modes
introduced by this type of aiding. The next section will discuss the issues surrounding the
technology of display enhancements, as well as determine the possible error modes introduced by
this technology. The third section will identify some of the differences in expert and novice
decision-making which may help identify how different types of aiding systems may aid different
skill levels in different ways. Then research will be outlined in which to compare and contrast the
technologies of intelligent decision-aiding with display enhancements, as well as the effects found
when using both with different skill levels of operators. Finally, the expected contributions of this
research will be described.
Characteristic Issues of Intelligent Decision-Aiding
Intelligent decision-aiding is an area which has been the focus of much research in the
hopes of discovering ways to improve the performance of human-machine systems. Woods
[1986], Woods and Roth [1988], Norman [1988], and Hopkin [1988] are just a few of the many
researchers who have tried to determine what makes a good intelligent decision aid.
Among the issues which need to be addressed in the design of such a system is the role of
the decision aid in the system. Woods and Roth [1988] discuss the role of the aid as an instrument
(as opposed to as a prosthesis which is meant to replace people or to fill a human deficiency). As
an instrument the decision aid is to be used as a reference or extra source of information for the
human problem solver. This perspective leaves the human in control and performing more than
mere supervisory tasks. People are not particularly good at monitoring, and therefore, keeping the
controller active is an advantage. The system is also more flexible when the aid is used as a tool
and not as a replacement, in that special cases can be more easily handled.
A decision aid can merely identify the existence of a problem or it can also give advice to
help in solving the problem. Woods and Roth [1988] define good advice as more than
recommending a solution. Advice needs to be given in the situations which call for it, and only
when needed. If failures of attention are a problem in performing a task, an aid which focuses the
operator's attention on the relevant information is an appropriate goal for the designer [Woods
1986].
The issues of usability and understandability need to be addressed. Information needs to
be presented in clear formats that are easy for people to use and understand. After all, what good
is providing the user with a decision aid if the user can not use it properly or does not understand
what the aid is telling him? To guard against this problem, Norman [1988] advocates doing "user-
centered design." He suggests the following principles of good design:
Make things visible: The user should be able to tell what is going on by merely
looking at the interface.
• Provide the user with a good conceptual model: The designer should provide the
user with a mental model that is consistent and coherent.
• Provide the user with good mappings: The user should be able to determine the
relationships between actions and their results.
• Provide the user with feedback: The user should receive full and continuous
feedback about the results of all actions.
Another key issue is that of user acceptability. What good is a decision aid if the user does
not want to use it or does not have faith in it? If the user is expected to override the computer
recommendations, he should have the actual authority to do so. If the aid is used continually, care
needs to be taken so that boredom is not aggravated in users when the work load is light, by
reducing their workload even more [Hopkin 1988]. Often dangerous accidents and failures of
attention occur when the user is less active, rather than under high workload situations.
The type of information which is revealed to the operator is another consideration of this
type of aiding. If the operator receives just a warning indicating a problem, but is not told what the
problem is, this is not very useful and could be found to be more of a nuisance than an aid. Also
important is how the operator is alerted to a warning. For example, if he hears an annoying buzz
or beep every time there is a possible conflict, and if this were to happen constantly, the buzz or
beep could prove more distracting and a nuisance, and may in fact no longer serve its function if
the user decides to tune it out (or even to disable it) [Norman 1988].
Also important to consider is whether the aid is working at the correct level of abstraction
or whether it is supporting the correct mode of problem solving. Vicente and Rasmussen [1990a,
1990b] propose a method for interface design they call ecological interface design (EED). EID is
based upon Rasmussen's skills, rules, and knowledge (SRK) framework for human performance
and on his means-ends abstraction hierarchy which illustrates the functional properties of a system
[Rasmussen 1986]. The SRK framework proposed that information can be detected in three
ways—as signs, signals, and symbols. Information is perceived as signals when the operator
detects the time-space behavior of the data. Signs are interpreted when the perceptual
characteristics of the data are detected. Finally, symbols are perceived which represent concepts
and have meaning. SRK claims that the way in which information is detected is related to the way
it is processed [Vicente 1988]. Therefore, the three different forms if information—signals, signs,
and symbols—refer to three different processing modes—skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-
based behavior. "The basic implication is that one should design interfaces in such a way as not to
force cognitive control to a higher level than the demands of the task require, while at the same time
providing the appropriate support for all three levels [Vicente and Rasmussen 1990a]." By
providing a sentential aiding system, skill-based performance is not supported. Signs and signals
are not conveyed, only symbols—the words.
The abstraction hierarchy is a tool used to describe the functional properties of a system.
"Such a hierarchy describes bottom-up what components and functions can be used for, how they
may serve higher level purposes, and, top-down, how purposes can be implemented by functions
and components [Rasmussen 1986]." The levels in the abstraction hierarchy include physical form
physical function, generalized function, abstract function, and system purpose. The hierarchy
provides a way to structure the properties to be represented in the interface, while the constraints
revealed within the hierarchy enable the operator to focus his attention on the most appropriate
system component by crossing through various levels of the hierarchy. In terms of the level of
abstraction, different levels can be supported by the intelligent decision aid, depending on exactly
which information is presented to the user. However, in order to support all levels in the
abstraction hierarchy, it would probably be necessary to supply the operator with so much verbal
information that it would require too much time for him to use it properly and it would require
more space than desired to implement.
Another concern is what happens if the aid is inoperational and the operator needs to
function on his own. Will he lose the skill he needs to detect possible problems on his own after
using an aid for a while [Woods 1986]? If the user is depending on the aid to alert him to dangers,
will he stop using particular cues which he would need to perform this replaced function, but
which would also help him in determining a resolution to the problem?
Therefore, we see that the following possible error modes may be introduced into a system
through the use of intelligent decision-aiding:
• increased boredom of the operators leading to worsened performance;
• lack of trust in the aid;
• lack of responsibility taken by the user for override of the decision aid;
• skill reduction in the operator,
• failure of the operator to attend to important situational cues;
• lack of user acceptance of the aid;
• inability of the operator to identify problem resolutions (when they are not provided
by the aid);
• worsened system performance due to the aid being a nuisance.
The next section considers the issues surrounding enhanced displays. As will be seen,
many of the issues are similar to those discussed in this section. However, due to the inherent
nature of these two technologies, they each have a set of issues which characterize them with
respect to system domain and implementation.
7Characteristic Issues of Display Enhancements
Display enhancements have been more recently proposed as an alternative to intelligent
decision aiding for certain human-machine systems. Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson
[1987] and Vicente and Rasmussen [1990a, 19905] have looked at the effects which interface
design can have on modes of processing and at how interface design can be improved so as to take
better advantage of natural human abilities, two of the issues involved in determining how
enhanced displays can work as a tool for decision aiding.
Because of the inherent nature of enhanced displays the role of this technology in the
system is that of an instrument. Again, the human operator is left in charge while the enhanced
displays are designed to aid him in focusing on the correct information when it is needed.
However, this is the area where the designers need to be the most careful. The question is
whether, when actually implemented, the enhancements actually help the user to find, integrate, or
interpret the right data at the right time. If implemented incorrectly, the enhancements can create
confusion and become a hindrance. Larkin and Simon [1987] in studying pictorial representations,
have found that although the following characteristics are not sufficient for a diagram, or in this
case an interface display, to be useful, they are necessary for the construction of a useful pictorial
representation: information to be used together should be grouped together in order to reduce the
search required to find the necessary elements; location should be used to group information about
particular elements to eliminate the need to match symbolic labels; and perceptual inferences should
be supported. Along with these guidelines, the suggestions made by Norman [1988] for effective
interface design should also be followed. Related to this issue is again the issues of usability and
understandability, as discussed in the previous section.
Another concern is whether the information displayed through the enhancements actually
does aid the operator in making a decision. When a conflict or potentially dangerous situation
arises, do the displays merely inform the user of this possibility, or do they also help him in
deciding how to resolve the problem situation? Since Woods and Roth [1988] have defined good
8advice as that which is given in situations which call for it, and only when needed, will enhanced
displays create more confusion by conveying extra information, or "advice," continually?
Woods [1986] also recommends for goal-directed knowledge representation, "possible
actions are organized around the goals that they can effect, and data about pre-conditions, post-
conditions (effects), constraints (side effects or inter-goal couplings) and alternative means are
captured." In other words, entire contexts are considered. However, in a complex, dynamic
system, the current "context" is always changing. It is possible that the display enhanced interface
will not be able to isolate contexts for each task, and in doing so does not focus the operator's
attention on the important information. However, Woods [1986] also claims that "if available data
are organized and displayed so that the user can directly see the state of task-meaningful objects [as
is the case in general for display enhanced interfaces], then natural mechanisms for focusing in on
the relevant data for the current context will be more effective."
In terms of user acceptability, because of the inherent nature of enhanced displays they are
different from intelligent decision aids in how the user views them as part of the system. To the
user, the enhanced displays are merely a part of the user interface of the system he is working
with. The display is not a computer trying to tell the person what to do (although indirectly they
are). In this sense, user acceptability is viewed differently in considering enhanced displays then
when considering traditional decision aids. If the user is content to work with the system interface
as presented to him, the designer needs not consider what would happen if the user decides to
ignore direct suggestions for actions or warning of potential crises—instead the user sees himself
as determining these for himself.
Similar to intelligent decision-aiding is the question of what happens if the aid (in this case
the system with the enhanced displays) is inoperational and the operator needs to function on his
own. Will the user lose the skill he needs to detect possible problems on his own after using the
aid for a while? Or will the use of the aid have effectively trained him to know where to look on
the system display by himself? This issue is important not only in the case of an emergency or
unexpected situation, but it brings up many points related to the training of operators, as well.
Finally, another issue to consider is whether the display enhancements are at the wrong
level of abstraction or support the wrong mode of problem solving. The abstraction hierarchy
and the modes of problem-solving associated with the SRK framework were described in the
previous section. Enhanced displays have the inherent capability of better supporting these three
processing modes than the decision-aiding system alternative when they are designed properly.
Also, in terms of levels of abstraction, the enhanced display version of a decision aid better
supports such a structured view if the system properties to be represented in the system interface
by providing support for answering the questions, WHY (going up in the hierarchy) and HOW
(going down). The interface for the decision aiding system does not directly support these
questions or this structure.
Therefore, from this discussion we can see that the following possible error modes may be
introduced into a system by the introduction of enhanced displays:
• skill reduction in the operator,
• failure of the operator to attend to important situational cues;
• inability of the operator to identify problem resolutions;
• worsened system performance due to the aid creating more confusion and being a
hindrance.
Now that we have examined the issues characteristic of each type of decision-aiding
technology, it is important to investigate the differences in decision-making processes found in
varying levels of expertise in operators. These differences may help to identify what is needed of a
decision aid intended to help a particular type of operator. They may also lend advice when
determining how to best aid the training of operators.
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Differences in Expert and Novice Decision-Making
Psychologists have been interested in studying the distinctions between expert and novice
behavior in many different task domains. For example, Chi, et. al. [1981] have studied the
differences in solving physics problems, Staszewski [1988] has looked at expertise in mental
calculation (specifically, "lightning mental calculators"), and Soloway, et. al. [1988] have
examined how expert and novices write (and read) computer programs. Tasks like these are
concerned exclusively with the acquisition of cognitive skills. This work contrasts with that which
focuses on skill acquisition of perceptual skills. It is the latter which will be examined in this
section because the the research proposed here will involve human-environment interaction.
Investigating how people interact with their environment, Dreyfus, Dreyfus, and
Athanasiou [1986] have witnessed five common stages of skill acquisition in the progression from
novice to expert. Their research has dealt with such areas as piloting airplanes, playing chess,
driving automobiles, and learning a second language. The five stages they found are novice,
advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert.
The authors theorize that this progression from novice to expert is characterized by the
following behavior. During the novice stage context-free elements and rules are learned. These
elements and rules are considered context-free because they are clearly defined and easily
recognized independent of the specific situation in which they occur of apply. Eventually, with
practice and increased experience, novices learn to recognize "situational" elements which are
context-sensitive and not objectively definable. At this point they become advanced beginners.
More experience leads to the ability to adopt a plan to organize a specific situation. In this way
competent behavior allows someone to improve his performance and make decisions in a
hierarchical manner. Proficient behavior is characterized by the ability to "intuitively" make
decisions be relating present situations to previously experienced situations. In this way the person
can use expectations and previously used plans to solve new problems. Finally, an expert makes
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decisions and solves problems easily and without effort. He performs naturally and does "what
normally works."
This model has not yet been formalized (computationally) and has not yet been rigorously
evaluated. However, it does provide a way of looking at the progression from novice to expert
which considers the environmental factors and which appears to occur across a wide variety of
domains.
Focusing on the final stage of acquisition, Klein [1989] has proposed a model to explain
expert decision-making which consists of four main steps: 1. recognizing cases as typical; 2.
understanding the situation; 3. evaluating alternatives; and 4. progressive deepening. Decision
makers rely on their previous experience to recognize and classify situations as typical.
Understanding a situational is comprised of recognizing four types of information—plausible
goals, critical cues and causal factors, expectancies, and typical actions. Once classified, the
decision maker can recall the typical way of handling that type of situation. He would use available
time to evaluate whether or not an option would be appropriate. This might be done using
imagery, where the decision makers would imagine implementing the option, in order to determine
if anything might go wrong. If problems do arise in this imaging, the plan could be modified or
even rejected. If a satisfactory plan if found, it is implemented. If a plan is rejected, a new one is
selected and evaluated.
While the cognitive model here consists of familiar situations, typical actions, goals,
expectancies, progressive deepening (imagining how an option will be carried out within a specific
situational context), evaluation, and selection, the environmental model consists of situational cues,
actions, decision points, and outcomes. Therefore, the model is sensitive to the critical cues which
the decision-maker has learned to recognize. The expert decision maker is the one who has learned
to distinguish which of the available cues are the critical ones. Although this work is supported by
studies Klein has done in perceptually rich domains involving fireground commanders, tank
platoon leaders, and design engineers, it has not been rigorously tested or completely formalized
either.
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Lesgold, et. al. [1988] have studied varying levels of performance in another perceptually
rich domain, that of X-ray diagnosis. They have found that experts first seem to develop mental
representations which in turn direct perception. Experts also appear to evoke an appropriate
behavioral schema rather quickly. They know where to look and what cues to look for. In other
words, they "have the ability to discriminate between relevant information and 'noise1 in a given
domain of action, by invoking both precepts and practice ... [Suchman 1987]." In contrast to
novices, they were able to distinguish subtle differences and were more flexible in considering
other possibilities based on feature detection. Lesgold, et. al. also found that performance was a
nonmonotonic function of experience (similar to results found in language learning [Hetherington
and Parke 1986]), that is, performance does not increasingly improve as people gain more
experience. In between the stages of novice and expert, people reach a stage where their
performance degrades slightly. Lesgold, et. al. studied aspects of both cognitive and perceptual
learning. They proposed that the development of expertise first comes through a "perceptual
tuning" in which the stimulus pattern was classified with the diagnostic decision which had the
highest probability of occurring. The result of this perceptual processing would then be used for
cognitive processing to resolve ambiguity. This cognitive processing can not evolve until
perceptual processing has been tuned and, therefore, they propose that the development of
expertise is a shift from purely perceptual decision-making to progressively deeper cognitive
decision-making.
Using a different approach, DeGroot [1965] was interested in discovering the differences
between players of varying degrees of expertise in the domain of chess. Specifically, DeGroot
looked at chess players at the expert and Grand Master levels. Each subject was given the identical
chess position and then verbal protocols were taken as he decided what move to make. Results
showed that there was essentially no difference in the thought processes between the two groups—
search patterns, number of moves considered, etc. The only real difference between the levels was
in the quality of the move finally chosen.
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Similarly, Chase and Simon [1973] conducted a study in which they replicated some of
DeGroot's results and tried to isolate and define the structures (i.e., chunks) into which the
information perceived by chess players is organized and stored in memory. They used three levels
of players—novice, intermediate, and master. Two tasks were used in this experiment—the
perception task and the memory task. The perception task required chess players to reconstruct a
chess position while the original remained in view. The memory task required players to
reconstruct a position from memory after being exposed to the target board for a short time (5-10
seconds). In the perception task, evidence was found indicating more rapid encoding of
information for the more experienced players. In the memory task Chase and Simon found the
number of pieces per chunk varied among the skill levels and that the pieces within a chunk seemed
to have relationships of defence or attack, to be close together, and to be of the same color and
type. Finally, an interesting result found was that when both groups of players (experts and
novices) were confronted by random positions (not found in actual games), they both did equally
poorly.
In contrast to most of the research described here, very little work has been done in
domains involving human-environment interaction which are non-adversarial and deal mostly with
skill (as opposed to cognitive processes). An example of this type of research is that done by
Deakin and Allard [1991] which investigates the ability of expert and novice figure skaters in
recalling elements of a figure skating routine. One important finding was evidence that figure
skaters do not simply memorize the sequence of elements for a routine in the same manner that they
would memorize a verbal list. Also, "expert skaters seem to have faster access to semantic
memory for skating elements than do novices."
Allard has also looked at expertise in sports requiring more open skills (occurring in a
moving and changing environment such as volleyball [Allard and Starkes 1980] and basketball
[Allard, Graham and Paarsalu 1980]). She has found that there are many similarities in chunking
and categorizing performance (thought to show the expert's ability to classify elements according
to the significance to the situation) between experts in these types of sport domains and those in
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more cognitive domains such as chess [Allard and Burnett 1985]. Evidence was also found that
expertise in this type of domain can be split into two components—declarative knowledge (for
cognitive tasks) and procedural knowledge (for playing the game).
Based upon much of this research (especially that done by Dreyfus, et. al. [1986], Klein
[1989], and Lesgold, et. al. [1988]) it appears as if novices, who work more with context-free
elements and rules and are not as able to identify subtle differences, are working more on a level
which can be best described using rules. If this is the case, an intelligent decision aid may make
more sense to them because it appears to be making decisions in a way more similar to the
processes that the novices themselves use. In contrast, experts behave more intuitively and are
very context dependent. Therefore, enhanced displays seem to operate in a way more consistent
with how they view the domain. It will be interesting to determine through the experiment
proposed in the next section whether this is indeed the case. Also, it will be interesting to see if the
different types of aiding have different effects evident in training novices to become experts.
Proposed Research
The research proposed in this section will compare the two decision-aiding techniques of
display enhancement and intelligent decision-aiding in the complex, dynamic domain, Star Cruiser
(see Kirlik [1990] for a complete description of this task). In particular, we will study the effects
that these two aiding systems have in creating possible errors modes, or performance problems, as
well as any differences in performance associated with different skill levels of operators.
Decision Aid Descriptions
Although the actual modified versions of the Star Cruiser task have not yet been created,
this section is intended to provide the reader with an idea of what the actual changes may involve.
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Two modified versions are needed—an intelligent decision-aiding system (DA) and a display
enhanced system (DE).
The DA version will provide a traditional sentential type of advice window which will
display to the user a ranked list of recommended actions. The recommendations could be ranked,
according to how many points could be scored if the recommendation is followed (with more
points being better). Also, if the operator tries to execute an action which is undesirable (i.e.,
deploy a manned ship to a planet which does not support life, deploy a ship to a planet without the
appropriate data or resources, load too many data or resources onto the star cruiser, etc.) the
system will respond with a dialogue box pointing out the error to the operator. In contrast, the
type of enhancements that might be included in the DE version include displaying an ellipse around
the star cruiser designating the regions it can travel to and make if back to its star base to refuel,
displaying to the operator only those types of ships that can be deployed in the solar system in
which the star cruiser is orbiting, highlighting only those craft containing data or resources that can
fit onto the star cruiser craft, and highlighting only those planets within orbit that a chosen craft can
be deployed to.
Basis for Comparisons
Performance on the two systems can be compared by examining the points scored, the
number of sessions which terminated early (due to running out of fuel, trying to load too many
data or resources onto the star cruiser, or crashing into suns), the number of times craft were
deployed to planets without resources or data, and the number of times manned craft were
deployed to planets without life support (and unmanned craft deployed to life-sustaining planets).
Experimental Design
For the main experiment, that of comparing version DA with version DE, nine main subject groups
will be required [see Figure 1]. Additionally, different levels of expertise (novice and expert) will
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also be examined in regard to these nine main subject groups. Appendix A contains the hypotheses
that may be tested in regards to the performance of the nine subject groups.
Anticipated Problem Areas
Extra care will need to be taken to try to ensure that neither of the two systems (DA or DE)
introduces more information than the other. Also, in order to extract more general conclusions
from the results found in this experiment, the Star Cruiser interface will need to be tested to
determine how sensitive it is to different implementations.
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Figure 1: Subject groups for the main experiment
Preliminary Analyses
Before the modified versions of the Star Cruiser task described in the previous section can
be created, a model of the Star Cruiser environment needs to be developed, which is independent
of the actual information contained in the implementations of the interface. An abstraction
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hierarchy is a means of doing this, without specifying strategies that should be used by the
operator. A preliminary hierarchy is shown in Figure 2 (Note: the second level is still in
development). Figure 3 shows the further decomposition of the collection function.
Also necessary before developing the decision-aiding versions of Star Cruiser, is the
identification of the different types of actions available within the Star Cruiser task with which the
user may need help in deciding what to do. A preliminary listing of these actions is found in
Appendix B. After these actions have been identified, those actions which can be aided both
perceptually (through enhanced displays) and cognitively (through sentential advice) need to be
discovered, as well as the means for implementing the aiding devices for these actions.
Finally, the chosen implementations for the decision-aiding techniques will be coded in
order to create the two modified Star Cruiser versions to be used in the comparison study described
previously.
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Star Cruiser Goal:
To collect as much data and resources as possible
from planets and deliver them to the Star Base, within
a ten minute session.
Map of Affordances
This map shows such things as:
*homing affordances (refueling/unloading)
*locomotion affordances
""collision affordances
*cargo affordances
*deployment affordances (for probes, satellites,
science ships, robot miners, miner ships)
*recall affordances (for probes, satellites, science
ships, robot miners, miner ships)
Thrust Gravity ScienceShips
Satellites RobotMiners
Miner
Ships Probes
Figure 2 Preliminary Abstraction Hierarchy for Star Cruiser
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Collection of
data from
life-supporting
planets
Collection of data
from
non-life-supporting
planets
Collection of
resources from
life-supporting
planets
Collection of
resources from
non-life-supporting
planets
Figure 3 Decomposition of the Collection Function
Expected Contributions
The research proposed here hopes to integrate the independent research done on each of the
two main decision-aiding technologies—intelligent decision-aiding and enhanced displays. It also
hopes to determine which types of systems are better aided by which type of aid by carefully
studying how domain characteristics interact with the characteristics and possible error modes
associated with each of the two technologies. Accomplishing this task would greatly contribute to
the areas of interface design and human-computer interaction, by providing guidelines for system
design.
Additionally, by studying the interaction effects between operator skill level and type of
decision aid, we hope to better understand the differences between expert and novice decision-
making by discovering how each is better aided and under which conditions each is better aided.
Finally, by studying the interaction effects between type of system trained on and type of decision
aid, we hope to discover important guidelines and issues involved in the training of operators.
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Appendix A
Hypotheses for the Star Cruiser Experiments
(Each letter here represents the performance of the corresponding subject group found in Figure 1.
DE = display enhanced version. DA = intelligent decision-aiding version)
A<B: equal training (unaided), DE leads to better performance than original unaided
A<C: equal training (unaided), DA leads to better performance than original unaided
A<D: something learned during training (on DE) is good and transferred (both tested on unaided)
A<E: something about DE is better than unaided
A<F: either something about training w/DE or testing on DA leads to better performance than
unaided
A<G: something learned during training (on DA) is good and transferred (both tested on unaided)
A<H: either something about training w/DA or testing on DE leads to better performance than
unaided
A<I: something about DA is better than unaided
B>C: same training (unaided), DE leads to better performance than DA
B>D: DE leads to better performance (nothing learned or not enough to offset during training)
B<D: more transferred during training w/DE
B<E: (want a little bit) but close to equal performance, diff. comes from training (equal testing—
DE)
BF
B>G: DA leads to better performance (not enough transferred during training to offset)
B<G: more transferred during training w/DA
B<H: something from DA transferred during training to improve performance on DE (better than
unaided)
B>I: DE leads to better performance than DA w/o training on it
C<D: something during training w/DE transferred and led to better performance
C>E: DA leads to better performance than DE even w/o training
C<F: something during training w/DE leads to better performance on DA than training unaided
C>G: DA leads to better performance (not enough transferred during training)
C<G: more transferred during training w/DA
CH
C<I: want a little better—shows better performance due to training w/DA (equal testing—DA)
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D<E: otherwise DE during training transferred and accommodated (equal training—DE)
D<F: DA leads to better performance than unaided w/ equal training on DE
D>G: something during training w/DE transferred and improved performance on unaided more
than training w/DA
DH
D<I: otherwise more transferred during training w/DE
E>F: otherwise equal training (on DE) but DA improves performance
E>G: otherwise more transferred during training w/DA than training and testing on DE
E>H: otherwise something during training w/DA transferred and led to improved performance on
DE
E>I: something about DE better than DA
FG
FH
F<I: otherwise something about DE during training transferred and led to improved performance
over DA
G<H: equal training (DA), DE better performance
G<I: equal training (DA), DA better performance than unaided
H<I: otherwise equal training (DA), DE better performance than DA
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Appendix B
Listing of Star Cruiser Actions
The following is a listing of possible actions available on the Star Cruiser application. A
total of five factors are discussed for each. The first paragraph under each action heading explains
when the action can and cannot be performed or, in other words, when the program will allow
the user to perform the action and when the user will not be allowed to do so. The second
paragraph explains when the user should and should not perform the actions. This section is
based on my own experience with the application and it details those times performing an action
can be beneficial or when it can be detrimental to the user's performance. The third paragraph
under each heading details what perceptual support exists for that action. It explains what
support currently exists, whether it is satisfactory or not, and possible improvements. Once again,
this is based on my experience with Star Cruiser and thus may differ from someone else's opinion.
There are several characteristics about Star Cruiser that one should keep in mind as s/he
read through this listing. The first is that whenever one of Star Cruiser's tools needs to be
deployed or recalled, the user must be viewing the map corresponding to Star Cruiser's location
(i.e., in galaxy - global map; in solar system - local map). In addition, "movement" of Star Cruiser
can only occur if it is not docked at Star Base or in an orbit. If it is, then Star Cruiser must first be
taken out of orbit or pulled away from Star Base before it can travel freely.
Finally, it should be realized that many of Star Cruiser's movements are in preparation for
the user to perform some other action. Most movements are the result of the user wanting either to
deploy or recall one of Star Cruiser's tools or have Star Cruiser return to Star Base in order to
refuel/unload cargo. Also, the choice (direction, speed) of movements may also depend on what
information is obtained through viewing the global or local maps. It becomes apparent that, due to
these factors, Star Cruiser's movement through the galaxy and solar systems is usually quite
dependent on other actions that the user has just performed or wishes to do in the near future.
Deploy Probe
A user may deploy a probe anytime except when docked at the Star Base. In other words, the only
time a probe can not be deployed is when the Star Cruiser is docked at the Star Base.
Deploying probes has no effect on points or fuel consumption and therefore can be done almost
anytime the user wants to. It is advisable to deploy probes when the user has difficulty locating the
9th orbital in order for the Star Cruiser to orbit a sun. Deploying a probe is also useful when the
user wishes to know the amount of data/resources in a particular solar system before visiting it. If
the user has little difficulty in obtaining orbit with the Star Cruiser and/or doesn't need to know the
amount of data/resources before visiting a particular solar system, then probe deployment has little
value.
There is currently no perceptual support that informs the user when it is possible or best to deploy
a probe. Since the deployment of a probe has no effect on fuel consumption or the user's score,
there is no real need to inform the user when a probe should be or shouldn't be deployed.
Blacking out the probes from the selection bar at the top of the screen can be of useful in
preventing the user from trying to deploy a probe while docked at the Star Base.
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Recall Probe
A probe in orbit around a sun may only be recalled by the user if the Star Cruiser is in orbit around
that same sun and the user is viewing the system in local mode. If the user is viewing the galaxy,
if the Star Cruiser is not in orbit in the same solar system as the probe, or if there are no probes in
the solar system currently being visited by the Star Cruiser, then no probes can be recalled.
Probes only need to be recalled if they are to be used somewhere else in the galaxy. If that is the
case, then it is suggested that the user recall a probe when all data/resources have been collected
from the particular solar system and/or the user no longer needs assistance in identifying the 9th
orbital. If the user still has trouble getting the Star Cruiser in orbit, then it is recommended that the
user do not recall the probe.
If the program determines that the user would like to deploy another probe, but none are available,
then it can highlight a probe that has already been deployed and is present in a system that contains
no more data/resources. This would let the user know immediately the most ideal probes to recall.
This, though, would be rather redundant in that the user can simply view the pie-chart present on
the suns in global mode to determine which solar systems no longer contain any data/resources.
Therefore, a significant amount of perceptual support already exists in helping the user to identify
the probes which can or need to be recalled.
Deploy Satellite/Robot Miner
A Satellite/Robot Miner can be deployed only when the Star Cruiser is in orbit around a sun which
contains planets and the user is currently viewing that particular solar system's local map. If the
Star Cruiser is not in orbit or in a solar system or if that solar system doesn't contain any planets or
if the user is not viewing the local map of the solar system containing the Star Cruiser, then
deployment of a Satellite/Robot Miner is not possible.
A Satellite/Robot Miner should be deployed to any blue planets containing data/resources that need
to be collected. They should also be deployed to any green planets that contain data/resources in
order to prevent any Science Ships/Minerships from automatically collecting to much
data/resources and thus preventing themselves from being recalled for fear of overloading the Star
Cruiser with too much data/resources. The only time it isn't beneficial to deploy Satellites/Robot
Miners is when there are no planets in the solar system which contain any data/resources.
No extensive perceptual support exists that helps the user decide whether or not to deploy a
Satellite/Robot Miner and if so, which planet to deploy it to. The only clues that are present to the
user are the Star Cruiser's gauges that relate, qualitatively, how much data/resources is currently
on board the Star Cruiser. Because this action is one of the more important ones performed by the
user, better support should be present. One possibility is to automatically highlight a
Satellite/Robot Monitor (accompanied with a auditory signal) to signal to the user that one can be
deployed. In addition, by highlighting a particular planet, the user would also know where best to
deploy the Satellite/Robot Miner. It is questionable whether or not planets that contain too much
data/resources for Star Cruiser to handle should be highlighted. The absence of any highlighted
Satellites/Robot Miners would indicate that the user should not deploy any.
Recall Satellite/Robot Miner
When Star Cruiser is in orbit in a solar system where Satellites/Robot Miners are deployed to
planets and the user is viewing the solar system in local mode, then those deployed Satellites/Robot
Miners may be recalled. If the Star Cruiser is not in orbit in a solar system where Satellites/Robot
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Miners have been deployed or if it is the galaxy or if the user is viewing the galaxy, then
Satellites/Robot Miners may not be recalled.
Satellites/Robot Miners should be recalled when they are finished collecting the data/resources
from their particular planets. Care must be taken not to recall them if they have collected so much
data/resources that it would overload the Star Cruiser. Therefore, the user should recall the
Satellites/Robot Miners before they complete their missions if, in not doing so, they run this risk.
As with deployment, the only support present to the user in making the decision when to recall a
Satellite/Robot Miner are the Star Cruiser's gauges. Once again, the need is present for better
perceptual support. Deployed Satellites/Robot Miners can be highlighted when the program feels it
is best to recall them. This, of course, will depend on the amount of data/resources currently
present aboard Star Cruiser and how much the Satellites/Robot Miners have and/or can collect at
their planets. If they can collect all of the data/resources without resulting in an overload when
recalled, then the program can highlight the Satellites/Robot Miners when they have completed
their missions. If the planets contain too much data/resources, then the program can highlight them
before they finish, thus informing the user that they need to be recalled as soon as possible. If the
Satellites/Robot Miners have already collected too much for one reason or another, then the
program will not highlight them until the Star Cruiser has unloaded it's current haul at Star Base
and returned to the current solar system.
Deploy Science Ship/Minership
Science Ships/Minerships can be deployed under the same circumstances as Satellites/Robot
Miners with the one exception that green planets must be present in the solar system since they may
only be deployed to a planet which "supports life." If no green planets are present in the solar
system, or if any of the other conditions similar to Satellites/Robot Miners are not met, then
Science Ships/Minerships cannot be deployed.
Science Ships/Minerships should be deployed whenever green planets are present in the solar
system and contain data/resources. They should, however, not be deployed if the total
data/resources that will be collected by any one Science Ship/Minership will overload the Star
Cruiser. Therefore, if this risk exists, then Science Ships/Minerships should not be deployed.
*** Refer to the discussion of perceptual support for Satellites/Robot Miners. The issues
discussed there may also be applied to the Science Ships/Minerships. ***
Recall Science Ship/Minership
*** All issues discussed under Recall Satellite/Robot Miner may also be applied here. The one
exception is in regard to highlighting the Science Ships/Minerships. Since these ships will move
from green planet to green planet, collecting all available data/resources and because the possibility
exists that these ships may collect so much data/resources that they would even overload an empty
Star Cruiser, the program should inform the user when to deploy multiple Science Ships/
Minerships (by highlighting them) in order to prevent this. This prevention is accomplished by
dividing the available amount of data/resources amongst various ships so that the smaller portions
may still be loaded onto Star Cruiser. ***
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Move Star Cruiser Into Orbit
Star Cruiser can be placed in orbit whenever it is present in a soar system. If it is moving about the
galaxy, then Star Cruiser cannot be placed into orbit around any of the suns.
The user should place Star Cruiser into orbit around a sun whenever satellites, robot miners,
science ships, and/or minerships are to be deployed in that particular soar system. Also, if any of
them, along with probes, are to be recalled from that same system, then Star Cruiser must also be
in orbit. It becomes unnecessary to place the Star Cruiser in orbit in a solar system if there are no
planets present or if the need/desire to deploy or recall any ships or probes does not exist in that
system.
The program already gives some hints to the user as to when it is necessary to obtain orbit with the
Star Cruiser. The pie-charts (in local mode) representing the amount of data/resources available on
a planet are an indication as to when ships should be deployed or recalled. These hints, however,
do provide a direct mapping between the desired situation (deploy/recall ship) and the means with
which to obtain the situation (put Star Cruiser in orbit). Therefore, more support is needed. One
possibility is to highlight both Star Cruiser and where it should be (9th orbital). This, though,
would have the drawback of showing the user exactly where the orbital is located thus making the
action almost too simple to perform and also removing one of the probe's functions (identify 9th
orbital). Displaying a message such as "Achieve Orbit" on the screen, which should be just as
informative, would be a better option in that it would not simplify the task or remove any functions
from the Star Cruiser's tools.
Move Star Cruiser Out Of Orbit
This action can only be performed if the Star Cruiser is already in orbit in some solar system and
the user is currently viewing that same system.
The Star Cruiser should be moved out of orbit if the user has completed the task of either recalling
as many deployments as desired or if the user wishes to exit the solar system for some reason such
as moving to a new solar system or going to the Star Base. It is advisable, however, that Star
Cruiser remain in orbit in order to recall as many deployments as possible as long as the risk of
overloading on data/resources does not exist or there is no threat of running out of fuel.
No perceptual support exists that aids the user in determining when is the most opportune time to
move out of orbit. None is really needed either. If enough support exists which informs the user
of other actions to perform with Star Cruiser (i.e., dock at Star Base, recall satellite, etc.), then the
user should know that in order to perform those tasks, Star Cruiser must or must not be in orbit.
If the user does not know this though, a simple message can be used to provide instruction.
Move Star Cruiser Into Solar System
If Star Cruiser is moving about the galaxy, the user then has the option of moving it into a solar
system. Star Cruiser cannot move directly from one solar system to another without first entering
the galaxy. Nor can Star Cruiser enter a solar system if it is docked at Star Base. It must first pull
away from Star Base, then it may enter a solar system.
It is beneficial to have Star Cruiser enter a solar system if that system contains any data/resources
that the user wishes to collect. Thus, if the user wants to deploy any ships, then Star Cruiser must
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first enter the solar system before anything else can be done. This also holds true if the user wants
to recall any ships. The user should try to prevent Star Cruiser from entering any solar systems if
the current task is to get Star Cruiser to Star Base so it can dock. This is critical if Star Cruiser is
low on fuel since it may not be able to reach Star Base if it keeps entering and exiting solar
systems.
The only support in determining when to enter a solar system that the program provides the user
with are the pie-charts that may be located on the suns in the global mode. Noticing whether or not
a particular solar system contains any data/resources can help the user decide if it is worth entering.
There may be many solar systems, however, that contain data/resources. Therefore, the program
should also suggest to the user which particular solar system Star Cruiser should enter. This can
be done by printing the message "Enter Highlighted Solar System" along with highlighting a
particular sun.
Move Star Cruiser Into Galaxy
If Star Cruiser is in some solar system, but is not in orbit, then the user may move Star Cruiser
directly into the galaxy without having to perform any other intermediate tasks such as moving Star
Cruiser out of orbit first.
When the user has completely loaded up Star Cruiser with data/resources and has already taken it
out of orbit, then Star Cruiser should be moved into the galaxy so that it can make its way to Star
Base. In addition, whenever Star Cruiser no longer needs to remain in a solar system, it should be
moved into the galaxy so that it may travel to another system or to Star Base. Star Cruiser should
more than likely not move into the galaxy if there still remains more data/resources that can be
collected without causing an overload of Star Cruiser and if Star Cruiser is not at risk of running
out of fuel.
There is no direct assistance provided to the user that says when Star Cruiser should exit the solar
system and enter the galaxy. However, the pie-charts depicting the available data/resources shown
on the planets, or their absence, should help the user determine whether or not it is worth staying
in the solar system. In addition, the fuel gauge and Star Cruiser's gauges showing its remaining
capacity for data/resources also help the user decide if Star Cruiser need to move into the galaxy so
it can go and dock at Star Base. This, though, is generally enough support. Other assistance such
as informing the user to dock at Star Base should provide further help in determining when to enter
the galaxy.
Dock Star Cruiser At Star Base
The user may only dock Star Cruiser at Star Base if Star Cruiser is present in the galaxy and the
user is viewing the global map. If Star Cruiser is in any solar system, then it cannot dock at Star
Base.
Star Cruiser should dock at Star Base whenever it cannot carry any more data/resources or
whenever it is about to run out of fuel. If Star Base is nearby, though, and Star Cruiser still can
carry more data/resources without becoming overloaded and still has plenty of fuel, it is sometimes
good strategy to dock at Star Base to unload the cargo and refuel. This proves beneficial when it
comes time to have Star Cruiser journey to those solar systems which are far from Star Base. Star
Cruiser should not be forced to dock at Star Base if it is not necessary if the base is far away.
Since these missions have a time limit, actions of this nature will only waste that time.
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The fuel gauge and Star Cruiser's data/resource gauges help the user determine when it is
necessary to have Star Cruiser dock at Star Base. This should generally be enough support.
During high workload situations, however, the user may forget to check these gauges. Therefore,
as a safety precaution, it is probably wise to display some message informing the user that Star
Cruiser better dock at Star Base. This would appear only under "must"-situations. The user
should be allowed to determine whether or not Star Cruiser should dock without the use of any
other additional information besides the gauges.
Have Star Cruiser Leave Star Base
The user can have Star Cruiser leave Star Base right after it has docked there.
Star Cruiser should be made to leave Star Base right after docking since no other actions can be
performed until it has done so. The only time it would not be necessary to leave Star Base is when
all data/resources have been collected, thus ending the scenario.
No perceptual support informing the user to pull Star Cruiser away from Star Base is needed. The
fact that nothing else can be accomplished until Star Cruiser's departure provides enough of a
forcing function to remind the user to do so.
View Galaxy (Star Cruiser In Solar System)
The galaxy may only be viewed if Star Cruiser is in orbit in some solar system. The only other
time that the global map is viewed is when Star Cruiser is traveling through the galaxy itself.
This action's purpose is merely to gather information about various states of the system. Such
items that may be checked by the user include the collection status of the total amount of
data/resources in a different solar system; the distance from the current solar system to Star Base;
or the proximity/location of other solar systems to the current system. This action is useless if the
user does not desire any such information.
Because this action merely provides information to the user (it does not alter the system states in
anyway), no perceptual support is required. If the user desires some piece of information that can
only be gathered through viewing the global map, then the user will select that option. If it cannot
be selected, then the user will realize that Star Cruiser is not in orbit and that it may be simpler to
just move Star Cruiser into the galaxy. Since there is no way of determining which information the
user would like to have access to, it is difficult to have the program support the decision to view
the global map.
View Solar System (Star Cruiser In Galaxy)
If a probe has been deployed to a particular solar system or if Star Cruiser has previously visited it,
then that system may be viewed while Star Cruiser is traveling around the galaxy. The only other
method for viewing a solar system is to have Star Cruiser enter the system.
This action merely provides information to the user. Such information may include the number of
planets in a particular solar system or the collection status of deployments in that system. If no
information is desired about a particular system, then the user need not perform this task.
No perceptual support for this action is needed. Since no changes are being made to the system
states and it is difficult to know exactly when the user desires information, let alone what kind, it
would be almost pointless to try to provide any support for deciding when to perform this action.
31
REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS TO SUPPORT DESIGN:
TOWARDS ECOLOGICAL TASK ANALYSIS
Alex Kirlik
Georgia Institute of Technology
Abstract
Cognitive engineering is largely concerned with creating environmental designs to support skillful
and effective human activity. The goal of this chapter is to propose a set of necessary conditions
for psychological models capable of supporting this enterprise. An analysis of the psychological
nature of the design product is used to identify a set of constraints that models must meet if they
can usefully guide design. It is concluded that cognitive engineering requires models with
resources for describing the integrated human-environment system, and that these models must be
capable of describing the activities underlying fluent and effective interaction. These features are
required in order to be able to predict the cognitive activity that will be required given various
design concepts, and to design systems that promote the acquistion of fluent, skilled behavior.
These necessary conditions suggest that an ecological approach can provide valuable resources for
psychological modeling to support design. Relying heavily on concepts from Brunswik's and
Gibson's ecological theories, ecological task analysis is proposed as a framework in which to
predict the types of cognitive activity required to achieve productive behavior, and to suggest how
interfaces can be manipulated to alleviate certain types of cognitive demands. The framework is
described in general terms, and illustrated with an example from our previous research on
modeling skilled human-environment interaction.
Note: This paper is a draft of a chapter for a forthcoming book, The Ecology of Human-Machine
Systems. J. M. Flach, P. Hancock, J. Caird, and K. J. Vicente (Eds.), Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum.
Please do not cite or distribute. Comments are welcome to: kirlik@chmsr.gatech.edu
This research was supported by NASA Ames grant NAG2-656 to the Georgia Institute of
Technology, Robert J. Shively, technical monitor.
INTRODUCTION
Modern psychology judges its progress and products by a variety of criteria. Reviewing a
number of paradigms in current cognitive psychology, Claxton (1988) suggests that the research
community gives no less that thirteen answers to the question: "How do you tell a good cognitive
theory when you see one?" Each of the thirteen criteria he mentions (e.g., experimental,
computational, evolutionary) has enough adherents so that research programs are judged
successful even if their products meet perhaps only one of these standards of merit. Research
activity in current cognitive science thus resembles a massively parallel search, where most of
Claxton's thirteen criteria for scientific success are suspended on any one search path so that
individual research efforts can proceed unencumbered by a diverse set of otherwise paralyzing
constraints. For example, in certain paradigms computational realization is the primary concern,
mathematical formalization the major constraint in others, and in still others a necessary condition
for a theoretical model may be a demonstration that the proposed cognitive mechanisms and
processes could have emerged through human development or evolution. The eventual success of
this divide and conquer venture, of course, hinges not so much on whether each of the many
paradigms meets its own goals, but rather, on whether we are somehow able to integrate the
resulting array of research products into useful and coherent theory.
It is natural to wonder whether we have decomposed our research efforts in a way that will
allow for eventual theoretical unification. One primary concern is whether the many research
paradigms that comprise cognitive science are moving along diverging or converging paths.
Perhaps this is a question best left for time to decide. I am concerned, however, that although
strict and dogmatic adherence to a single scientific criterion may lead to individually successful
hillclimbing, when considered overall we may find we have all climbed different hills, and if
anything, actually increased the difficulty of the journeys between us. A coherent, useful cognitive
theory will have to meet a large number of constraints. Rarely, however, do good solutions to
problems which involve meeting multiple constraints emerge by decomposing the problem via the
constraints themselves. Knowing the least expensive restaurant in town, the one with the best
food, and the one with the healthiest menu is not particularly helpful in allowing one to find a good
square meal at a fair price.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify a set of necessary conditions for psychological models
capable of supporting the design of environments to promote skillful and effective human activity,
i.e., cognitive engineering (Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1978; Norman, 1986; Rasmussen,
1986; Woods and Roth, 1988). This effort is motivated by my own limited success in attempting
to apply the products of cognitive science to cognitive engineering. My experiences have led be to
believe that the central problem that needs to be overcome to make the products of cognitive science
more relevant to design is identifying a more productive set of dimensions along which modeling
efforts can be decomposed. We simply must decompose the complex problem of cognitive
modeling in order to make any headway. However, for cognitive engineering at least, the
decomposition must be derived from an overall framework capable of ensuring that the resulting
research products can be reassembled into a coherent theory useful for design.
A description of a solution to any problem, even if expressed only as a set of necessary
conditions, plays a crucial role in formulating a problem decomposition strategy capable of
ensuring that the subproblem solutions can be effectively integrated. We have to know where we
are going if we want to get there. In terms of the previous analogy, we have to know that our goal
is a good square meal at a fair price in order to determine how to decompose the problem of finding
an appropriate restaurant. A necessary step toward a more applicable cognitive science, therefore,
is a statement of the the set of constraints that must be met if a psychological model is to support
design. There may be no good reason to expect that the set of constraints that must be satisfied to
support design are identical to the set of constraints cognitive scientists normally use to guide their
scientific explorations. In fact, I will suggest below that the necessary conditions for an acceptable
psychological model in cognitive science are quite different than the necessary conditions for a
psychological model capable of guiding design. Many of the difficulties involved with trying to
apply cognitive science modeling arise out of this mismatch. Cognitive science has simply
decomposed its central problem in a manner that is very unfortunate for the cognitive engineer.
As Carroll (1991) has noted in regard to the failure of psychology to meaningfully contribute to
understanding the problem of human-computer interaction (HCI), the realization that the products
of a basic science do not provide effective resources for application can provide important lessons
for the basic science itself (also see Flach, 1990b; Gibson, 1967/1982; Neisser, 1976). The
solution to the problem of creating a scientific basis for cognitive engineering is not merely one of
improving the designer's access to research findings (e.g., Meister, 1989), moving research into
naturalistic or operational contexts (e.g., Klein, 1989), or improving generalizablity from
experimental results (e.g., Hammond, Hamm, and Grassia, 1986), although each of these goals is
surely important. Rather, I am convinced that the solution must lie in a reformulation of the
questions posed by the basic psychological research itself: a reformulation driven by an
understanding of the psychological nature of the design product and the knowledge that is required
in order to create it.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE DESIGN PRODUCT
A standard modeling approach in cognitive psychology is to hold a task environment relatively
fixed and to create a description of the cognitive activities underlying a person's behavior in that
environment. The designer, on the other hand, is faced with the opposite challenge of creating an
environment to elicit a desired behavior, with the ultimate goal being the creation of a design that is
maximally consistent with the principles underlying how people skillfully and effectively interact
with the world. In problem solving terms, the solution space for the scientist is the set of plausible
cognitive theories while the solution space for the designer is the set of technologically feasible
environments. We can thus characterize the scientist's problem as a search among possible
cognitive "solutions" to a given task, and the designer's problem as a search among possible
environments to obtain a given cognitive solution. These are symmetrical psychological problems
of comparable subtlety and difficulty, requiring equally sophisticated empirical and theoretical
methods. In this sense a theoretical/applied dichotomy does not appear to be a faithful way of
portraying the difference between the practices of cognitive psychology and environmental design.
One reason, though, for the perpetuation of the theoretical/applied distinction is a lack of
appreciation for the psychological nature of the design product. While the scientist creates theories
of cognitive function, it is assumed that the designer creates not theories but merely environments:
a mix of hardware and software that is best conceived in technological rather than in psychological
terms. But this perspective is based on an overly restrictive view of what the environment is, from
the standpoint of understanding human behavior. Although a design product may be implemented
in hardware and software, this is the wrong level at which to view the relevant features of that
product, just as it would be wrong to look for the relevant features of a psychological theory in the
software or ink in which it is realized.
As Carroll and Campbell (1989) have noted, each design product is actually an instantiation of
the designer's theories of how the environment influences how people behave, think, and skillfully
perform, however rudimentary and fragmentary these theories may be. Although the (good)
psychological theory is only implicit in the design of a (good) VCR interface, for example, it is
nonetheless real in exactly the same sense that the physical theories and electrical engineering
principles implicit in the design of the inner workings of the VCR are real. If you want to
understand or predict the functionality of the VCR, you had better know the operative physical
theories underlying its design. Similarly, if you want to understand or predict human interaction
with the VCR, you had better know the psychological theory underlying its design as well. While
the VCR can of course be looked at as an assemblage of physical matter, this is the wrong level at
which to look for the relevant structure of the machine, either for understanding electromechanical
function or for understanding user interaction. Both the electrical engineer and cognitive engineer
structure the physical matter using organizing principles derived from theories within their own
disciplines. It is the adequacy of these theories, rather than any facts solely about the physical
form of the machine, that determine whether the VCR will play, and whether the user can play it.
Each instance of human interaction with any artifact is thus a psychological experiment testing
the assumptions embodied in the environmental design (cf. Wise's (1985) construal of an
architectural design in terms of scientific hypotheses). Although it may be fashionable within the
cognitive engineering community to bemoan how little guidance modern psychology provides the
designer, the psychological nature of the design product is inescapable. The correct response to
the current and unfortunate lack of applicable psychological research is not to attempt to do
psychology-free design (since this is impossible -- the design will not be apsychological but
instead reflect the designer's "folk" psychological theory), but rather to ask what kinds of
psychological models are needed to support cognitive engineering, and to begin the long range
empirical and theoretical work necessary to realize them.
This is not to imply, of course, that cognitive engineers should wait for a more applicable
psychology to emerge before making design commitments (this would be hopelessly naive), or
should turn all attention to modeling and away from the design of prototypes and expanding
technological opportunities. It may be, as Braitenberg (1984) has suggested, that human capacities
for synthesis far exceed capacities for analysis, in the sense that our creative products reflect a
degree of implicit or tacit knowledge that is far more elaborate and rich than the knowledge we can
explicitly state and formalize. The direct manipulation interface was not deduced in any interesting
sense from psychological theory — in fact, a case could be made that we still have no unified
psychological theory that would predict the profound superiority of direct manipulation over
command interfaces for various tasks. It just so happened that in this case the designer had an
implicit understanding of how people naturally interact with the world that was closer to the truth
than any explicit and formal psychological theory available at that time. While cognitive
psychologists may be able to identify why command-line interfaces are inefficient in various ways,
it was the designers and not psychological research that pointed toward environments that support
more efficient interaction, a finding that should probably inform psychological research itself.
There is a catch, however, to this design-as-research strategy. Assuming a particular prototype
of a design concept is successful, any useful generalizations that emerge from creating the
prototype will be at the level of the psychological assumptions underlying the design, rather than at
the level of the particular technologies used to implement the design. To return to a point made
earlier, the hardware and software implementation is the wrong level to look for the relevant
features of the design product. Especially in HCI, a vast amount of research effort has been
expended trying to answer questions comparing various interface technologies, for example,
design options such as scrolling windows, hypermedia, etc. This research is of dubious value (see
also Vicente, this volume), since the "it depends" answers produced by such efforts will only lead
to a neverending series of technology-specific design principles, rather than a stable and generative
theoretical account of human-environment interaction that can guide design in novel situations.
To profit from the design-as-research strategy, then, it is incumbent upon the researcher to
make explicit the psychological assumptions that contributed most to the success of the prototype
system. A successful system demonstrates nothing other than its own success, unless the possibly
implicit psychological theory underlying the design is articulated. Although forcing the researcher
to articulate the theoretical assumptions prior to environmental design (as would be demanded by
traditional experimental psychology methodology) may actually impede progress ~ synthesis may
be more efficient than analysis — the hope for generalizable conclusions from such demonstrations
surely rides on whether the researcher can subsequently identify the psychological hypotheses that
were validated by the success of the prototype. There is probably no alternative to traditional
experimental methodology for this purpose. A research program using the design-as-research
strategy must include both an initial synthesis phase followed by an analysis phase where the
implicit psychological theory guiding synthesis is made explicit, tested, and communicated.
MODELING TO SUPPORT DESIGN
I have argued that a good psychological theory is a necessary aid to design by discussing the
essential psychological nature of the design product, and also by showing that the problem faced
by the designer is not one of mere application but is instead itself a theoretical problem comparable
to that faced by the scientist. A search for environments to promote a particular mode of cognitive
activity and behavior (the designer's task) is no more an applied endeavor than is a search for
accounts of cognitive activity and behavior that are promoted by particular environments (the
scientist's task). There is, however, an important difference between these two problems. The
designer and scientist search in opposite directions; one reasons over environmental models while
the other reasons over cognitive models. It should be expected, therefore, that different types of
heuristic guidance will be necessary to direct search in the two cases. As a result, the theories that
best provide heuristic guidance to the scientist will have different properties than the theories that
best provide heuristic guidance to the cognitive engineer. Let us examine how the theories that
would best support reasoning over environments might differ from the theories that would best
support reasoning across cognitive activities.
Much of our current understanding of cognitive-level human-environment interaction consists
of a set of somewhat independent <environment-process-behavior> triples, each of which provides
a psychological model of how a person might achieve a particular behavior in a specified
environment When the difficult but important job of integrating this knowledge into coherent
theory is attempted, these efforts typically focus on integrating across the process and behavior
dimensions rather than across the environment dimension. The result is that understanding the
environmental contribution to behavior is a largely ignored component in the theoretical unification.
One approach, for example, to achieving theoretical unification of this set of triples is to integrate
across the behavior dimension. The results here are powerful, typically hybrid "cognitive
architectures" (Card and Newell, 1989). These general purpose cognitive frameworks have the
processing resources to produce a wide variety of behaviors, from simple motor responses to
complex problem solving and planning. Yet another approach is to integrate primarily across the
process dimension in an attempt to show that the functionality of a wide variety of existing models
can be subsumed under a single process modeling formalism. Cognitive models demonstrating
how symbolic processing techniques can be implemented using neural network or connectionist
formalisms are good examples of partial theoretical unification along the process dimension.
Theoretical integrations along the environment dimension, however, are hardly ever attempted
but are critically needed to support the cross-environmental reasoning inherent in design. It should
not come as a surprise that most cognitive psychologists are not overly concerned with this type of
theoretical unification, since an acceptable scientific product is a model of behavior in a specified
environment, and rarely is reasoning backwards from cognitive theory to environment required.
Except perhaps in experimental design itself, rarely is the cognitive psychologist forced to reason
across environments in order to activate specified cognitive modes. Significant exceptions (i.e.,
attempts at theoretical integration across environmental influences on cognition and behavior) are
Rasmussen's (1986) theory of multi-level environmental representation as reflected in the
"abstraction hierarchy," and Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson's (1987) efforts to obtain a
rich enough set of environmental and task descriptors so that the cognitive mode underlying
judgment behavior (e.g., analytical, intuitive) can be predicted and promoted through
environmental manipulation. Only a unified theory of the environmental influences on cognition
can guide the designer's search for environments to activate specified cognitive processes.
But what would a unified theory of the environment look like, and what types of guidance
would it provide? What would be integrated in such a theory would be the diverse set of
knowledge of what the psychologically relevant aspects of the environment might be, for the
purpose of trying to understand or predict human behavior and performance. One must, for
example, determine when it will be appropriate to understand the environment in terms of stimuli
and reinforcements as in behaviorism; cues, criterion and feedback as in models of judgment;
options, chance nodes, choice nodes and probability distributions as in decision theory; initial
states, goal states and operators as in Newell and Simon's (1972) problem solving theory;
affordances or constraints on action as in Gibson's (1979) ecological theory, system state variables
and differential equations as in manual control theory, and so on.
Each of the above forms of environmental description has its place. No single representation of
environmental structure will do justice to understanding the many different forms of cognition and
behavior observed in complex human-environment interaction (Rasmussen, 1986). The reflection
of environmental structure in behavior is manifest in various ways, and each way is suggestive of a
different model that best describes the structure of the environment to which productive behavior
must be sensitive. A large part of design activity, in fact, can be viewed as the selection of
appropriate environmental descriptions. In some cases, the cognitive engineer faces the problem of
selecting an environmental description for an existing candidate design that will assist in predicting
the cognitive activity and behavior the environmental design will promote. In other cases in which
the cognitive engineer can operate earlier in the design cycle, the central problem will be to create a
design concept, expressed as an environmental model, that promotes a specified mode of cognitive
activity maximally consistent with the demands of a task. Guidance for both of these cognitive
engineering activities can only come from theoretical frameworks that support the designer's
reasoning over alternative environmental models.
Psychology may already have the rudiments of such a theory, but perhaps oddly, this
knowledge is expressed not so much in existing models of cognitive activity, but rather in the
process of designing experiments capable of successfully activating those cognitive activities for
scientific study. That is, it is the often tacit and unformalized knowledge guiding experimental
design in studies of cognition that approaches the type of understanding needed to reason
effectively over environmental models. When successful, the knowledge underlying the
experimenter's ability to promote a particular mode of cognitive activity is quite similar to the type
of knowledge necessary to guide system design. Much has been made of the inability of basic
experimental psychology research to guide design (e.g., Rouse, 1987, Meister, 1984), but perhaps
the fundamental difficulty is that the knowledge the designer needs goes beyond the experimental
findings, it may approach the knowledge needed to have actually designed these experiments.
8ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING
Cognitive engineering thus demands techniques for environmental modeling with a strong
theoretical basis, and the resulting environmental models must be as explicit, formal, and precise as
the models used to describe internal cognitive activity. A cognitive psychology capable of
predicting environmentally situated behavior and of supporting design will therefore have to be
concerned as much with the environment as with internal cognitive activity (e.g., Brunswik, 1952;
Gibson, 1979; Anderson, 1991). When one looks at the types of models produced by current
cognitive psychology, however, rarely does the environmental model receive close to the amount
of attention as does the internal cognitive model. There are at least three reasons for this state of
affairs.
First, experimental psychologists often feel the need to simplify their environments for the
purposes of control, and are thus able to get by with highly simplistic and impoverished
environmental models (compare the length of the stimulus description — the environmental model --
with the length of the description of the internal psychological model in most papers in the
cognitive experimental literature). Second, and especially in research within the cognitive science
orientation, often no distinction is even made between the description of the external environment
and the subject's internal representation of the environment. While it may indeed be the case that
interesting questions can be answered using such an approach (e.g., differences in the types of
internal representations used by expert and novice problem solvers), these accounts start so far
downstream that they fail to capture any influences of the external problem representation upon the
efficiency of problem solving activity (but see Larkin and Simon, 1987). Finally, rarely is it the
case that researchers working within an established paradigm are forced to reason across widely
varying environmental conditions, with the result that assumptions about environmental
descriptions can remain implicit within a given research program. There may be no pressure to
unconfound the environmental from the internal constraints on cognition and behavior when
environmental manipulations are made over a very narrow range.
Thus, the open problem for cognitive engineering is to determine under what environmental
conditions various cognitive activities will be activated, and required, for effective task
performance. To evaluate a candidate design, the issue is not only to understand cognitive
processes such as problem solving, decision making, and working memory, but also to determine
what problems will have to be solved, what decisions will have to be made, and what working
memory demands will be, given various design concepts for a particular task.
In the following I will discuss two types of constraints on acceptable psychological models that
arise due to the need to represent both internal and external influences on cognition and behavior.
The first set of constraints are structural. I will argue that the a model's structure must be capable
of representing both cognitive and environmental organization in a single, unified format; i.e., that
the appropriate unit of analysis and modeling must be the human-environment system, rather than
the human alone. The second set of constraints concern the content of acceptable models. I will
suggest that cognitive engineering is most in need of environmental models that assist in
understanding fluent, skilled human inte-action with the world, rather than environmental models
that rationalize detached intellectual activity. In most cases the design goal is (or should be) to
create a design which promotes fluent and skilled activity, rather than a design which promotes
cognitively-intensive control of behavior. We require environmental models that capture the
features of environments that promote effective, skilled performance in order to define a design
target and also to identify the causes of error-prone cognitive activity in current systems.
Modeling the Integrated Human-Environment System
One of the earliest attempts to model human-machine interaction concerned manual control
behavior, such as steering a car or flying an aircraft. Engineers familiar with the design of
electromechanical feedback control systems turned their attention to modeling the human as a
feedback control system in order to assess human capabilities and limits so that vehicles could be
designed so that control demands were within these limits. Control theory has a well specified
language for environmental modeling. The controlled "plant" (airplane, automobile) can be
described in terms of a transfer function that relates system inputs (steering adjustments) to system
outputs (heading). The human as a feedback controller can be described in similar terms. In this
case the input might be the heading of the automobile and the output would be a steering command.
As Flach (1990a) notes, the goal in this endeavor was to discover the human transfer function; i.e.,
a description of the function relating stimuli to response during manual control behavior. At this
schematic level of description, much current psychological modeling shares this goal of finding
invariance at the organismic level, rather than at the level of the organism-environment system.
These engineers were in for a rude awakening however, as empirical results indicated that the
there was no single human transfer function. Rather, the human transfer function appeared to
adjust to changes in the dynamics of the controlled system. As Birmingham and Taylor (1954)
noted, the ability of the human to adjust to the environmental transfer function was so great as to
suggest "that 'the human transfer function' is a scientific will-o'-the-wisp which can lure the
control system designer into a fruitless and interminable quest." (p. 1752) Subsequent modeling
attempts (McRuer and Jex, 1967) were only successful once the search for invariance in behavior
shifted to the level of the human-machine system, rather than in human behavior alone. The
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crossover model of human manual control behavior developed by McRuer and his colleagues is a
statement of behavioral invariance at the level of the human-environment system.
Why should this finding concerning human perceptual-motor behavior inform our discussion of
cognitive-level human-environment interaction? The answer is that there appears to be little reason
to expect that cognitive-level behavior will be any less adaptive to environmental structure than is
perceptual-motor activity. In fact, there are a variety of reasons to believe that just the opposite is
that case; i.e., that human cognitive interaction with the world is even less constrained, and thus
more flexible, than is perceptual-motor interaction. Note also that the correct response to this
situation, and the one pursued by these manual control researchers, is to describe both human and
environment as an integrated unit, and to use this unified human-environment model as a tool in the
search for behavioral invariance. Pursuing such a strategy requires formalisms capable of
expressing both internal and external constraints on behavior in the same language, such as the
transfer function representations used to model both the manual controller and the controlled
system.
Although rarely used, this approach has been successfully applied to understanding cognitive-
level behavior. The Lens Model framework for the description and analysis of human judgement
(Brunswik, 1952; 1956; Hammond, 1955) is a unified description of both the human judge and the
environment. As such, it has been a fruitful tool in understanding both the environmental and
cognitive constraints on judgment abilities, and has been enlightening as to a number consistencies
in judgment performance that would likely not have surfaced without some mechanism for
partialing out the environmental contribution to behavior (e.g., see Brehmer and Joyce, 1988).
The recent book by Anderson (1990) describing the Rational Analysis framework also represents a
step in the direction toward integrated human-environment system modeling. This framework
provides resources to address the question of how both internal "computational" constraints and
external environmental structure combine to determine the processes that will be engaged to
perform a particular task.
When we turn to the problem of understanding the kinds of environmentally "situated"
(Suchman, 1987; Whiteside, Bennett, and Holtzblatt, 1988) activity typical of behavior in modern
human-machine systems, it is clear that much work remains to be done before an integrated human-
environment modeling approach will be possible. However, the kinds of psychological
descriptions already being proposed for describing dynamic human interaction with technological
systems indicate a clear shift toward understanding how both environmental and cognitive structure
contribute mutually to the production of skilled behavior.
In a pair of penetrating analyses of the cognitive-level ecology of human-machine systems,
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Hutchins (1987; 1991) has suggested that human cognition and behavior cannot be understood
apart from the external devices in the environment that have been designed to perform cognitive
functions. In ship navigation (Hutchins, 1987), for example, human interaction with notepads,
checklists, and calculators can sometimes be used in lieu of memorial, procedural, and
computational operations; and in modern aircraft (Hutchins, 1991), much of the cognitive burden
for memory of intended and current speeds has been allocated to external memory structures within
the cockpit. In such environments, the entire cognitive function is distributed across both person
and environment. It is not surprising, then, that understanding these integrated systems requires
describing both internal and external cognitive functions in mutually compatible terms. We have
come full circle: the computer metaphor that gave rise to a description of human cognition in terms
of information processing has been turned back upon the world, as seen in the description of the
environment as external memories, external problem representations, and the like.
The importance of these environmental aids to thought and behavior cannot be underestimated.
Much of modern psychological research paints a rather dismal picture of human cognitive abilities
and limitations, leaving some of us in a state of wonder over how it can even be possible for
human cognition to have resulted in its modern achievements. But rarely does even the scientist
work in isolation from external cognitive tools, as Donald (1991) has noted.
For example, there is no internal wiring schema to support the kind of synthesis
made possible by a scientific diagram; the synthesis is out there, in the diagram itself.
The theoretician depends heavily upon a huge variety of external cognitive props ~
mathematical notations, curves, plots, histograms, analog measurements, and technical
jargon ~ to arrive at a theory. Without these things, thoughts of this kind would
simply not be possible, because the end-state or "conclusion" reached by the mind
is driven directly by the external representation itself. The locus of a process like
theoretical synthesis would thus be difficult to attribute to any single part of the internal-
external network that makes up such a system, (pp. 378-379).
The same comments would also apply, and perhaps in even greater force, to understanding the
mechanisms underlying skilled activity, such as flying an airplane, driving a car, or performing the
many routine tasks we find in daily life. Skilled activity is often accompanied by a heightened level
of intimacy with the world rather than by increased detachment, an observation that leads to the
hypothesis that intensive exploitation of environmental structure plays a key role in productive
behavior. As Norman (in preparation) has noted:
With a disembodied intellect, isolated from the world, intelligent behavior requires
a considerable amount of knowledge, lots of deep planning and decision making,
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and efficient memory storage and retrieval. When the intellect is tightly coupled to
the world, decision making and action can take place within the context established
by the physical environment, where the structures can often aid as a distributed
intelligence, taking some of the memory and computational burden off the human.
(Chapter 10, p. 6)
The human-environment system must serve as the unit of analysis and modeling to allow the
internal cognitive activity necessary for productive behavior to be predicted as a function of
environmental design, and also to identify how necessary cognitive activity can be engineered
through environmental manipulation.
The Need for Models of Fluent Interaction with the World
Since the goal of the cognitive engineer is often (but not always) to create an environmental
design that promotes fluent and effective skilled behavior, the features of environments that
support fluent as opposed to cognitively intensive behavior need to be identified and described. In
many existing human-machine systems, the reason that complex cognitive processing is necessary
for effective performance is that the environments in which the operators work are quite unlike
those environments in which human psychological abilities evolved. As a result, the acquisition of
fluent modes of behavior is impeded and the end state is one of only partially effective adaptation.
The problem of "situation awareness" (e.g., Sarter and Woods, 1991) in the modern commercial
aircraft cockpit is a prime example. Edwards (1988) has gone so far as to describe the cockpit as
an "opaque veil," and Bohlman (1979) suggests that the difficulty of maintaining an active
understanding of the aircraft and airspace from cockpit displays is so great that it is appropriate to
speak of crews as constructing "theories" of their situations.
As one who tries to make a living constructing theories, I find it most unsettling to think that
theoretical abilities are sometimes necessary to ensure safe flight. What kind of psychological
theory would provide the most leverage for remedying the situation awareness problem? Because
cognitively intensive activities such as inductive inference, hypothesis generation, and mental
modeling are observed in current systems, it seems only natural that better accounts of activities
such as these are the key to enhancing interaction. Such accounts could presumably guide the
design of aids to assist flight crews in their theoretical tasks, or the design of training methods to
make crews better theoretical thinkers. It is natural to view such attempts with suspicion,
however, since problem solving aids have the potential to create their own set of human-machine
interaction problems (Woods and Roth, 1988), and training to make people more "rational"
problem solvers or decision makers has yet to be proven effective.
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The alternative solution, of course, is to design environments more consistently with the
principles underlying skilled, dynamic human interaction with the world. Pursuing this strategy,
however, requires techniques for environmental modeling capable of representing the features of
task environments that both promote and inhibit the acquisition of fluent modes of behavior. Only
models of productive, skilled behavior can provide the resources for a task-analytic approach
capable of identifying features of an environmental design that are inconsistent with the principles
underlying skilled activity. The problem of identifying demands for complex cognitive activities
such as problem solving, planning, decision making posed by a given environmental design most
requires models of skilled, fluent behavior, not models of problem solving, planning, or decision
making activities.
Why is this the case? Due to their roots in either economic theory or artificial intelligence,
rational action models such as those mentioned above are more concerned with sufficiency
considerations than they are with necessity considerations. The great appeal of such models is
their ability to describe and often prescribe behavior in a huge variety of situations. Nearly any,
and perhaps all, behavior can be rationalized as being the result of some cognitively-intensive
process such as search through a problem space, hypothetico-deductive inference, or the
comparative evaluation of options with respect to a goal structure or utility function. No empirical
evidence could ever be brought to bear on limiting the sufficiency of these rational methods for
action selection. However, identifying when these sons of complex cognitive activities will
actually be necessary for successful performance requires models capable of indicating when such
activities are not necessary.
My observations of skilled human behavior in complex systems have led me to the working
hypothesis that cognitively-intensive methods for action selection are used only as a last resort;
i.e., when effective perception-action solutions are not readily available. Predicting cognitive
demands thus requires modeling approaches capable of defining when effective perception-action
solutions will not be available, and this knowledge can only be provided by a theory of perception-
action skill. I realize that the claim that skilled performers will typically opt for perception-action
solutions to cognitive tasks may strike the cognitive psychologist as being counter-intuitive.
However, intuitions based mainly on laboratory findings may be skewed by the fact that
experiments on cognition are typically carefully designed to preclude the availability of perception-
action shortcuts for meeting task demands. Although my own intuitions are largely based on
observations of behavior in operational settings, even in the laboratory I am continually amazed at
the cleverness of subjects who are able to short-circuit demands for complex cognitive activity by
cuing off the whir of a disk drive or an aberration in the graphics software. I have ceased to be
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suprised and frustrated by such cleverness, and have begun to view the tendency toward the
perceptual selection of action as a fundamental aspect of skilled behavior. There is no doubt,
however, that more empirical research is needed to clarify this issue. However, the necessary
experiments must provide rich enough environmental conditions and enough practice time so that
both cognitively-intensive and perception-action task solutions are made available. Such laboratory
experiments are rarely conducted.
These "experiments," however, are performed every day in both complex human-machine
systems and in more everyday work settings. As an example, over the past two years I have made
fairly extensive observations of the behavior of short-order cooks working busy rush periods at a
local area grill. My interest in this behavioral situation arose because skilled performance in this
setting appeared to possess many of the same properties I have observed in my more limited
observational studies in complex operational settings, and also because 24 hour access to this
environment can be readily secured for the price of a cup of coffee. And by making a well timed
food order or by initiating conversation with the cook, one even has an (albeit limited) capacity for
intervention and control over task demands.
In the environment I have studied, the cook uses an assortment of automated devices such as
fryers and ovens, combined with substantial manual activity at the grill, to coordinate the
preparation of the many items within each order, while preparing multiple orders simultaneously.
Describe this task in any formalism for rational action and the task demands appear overwhelming.
Observe this type of skilled human-environment interaction, though, and I believe the following
will be apparent. First, there is an intensive degree of intimacy in the cook's perception-action
interaction with the environment. The cook maintains tight perceptual contact with the world and
always seems to be taking some sort of action. Rarely if ever does the cook appear to engage in
detached, contemplative cognitive activity. Task demands are uncertain and arrive dynamically,
and ongoing behavior must be sensitive to a number of unpredictable events.
What allows this perceptually intensive mode of interaction to be productive? Note that the
cook's environment is highly structured, but nearly all of this structure is visible. The most
efficient "problem representation" for the cook to use is an external one: the grill area itself. Action
selection based on the external environment has considerable economies as compared to action
selection based upon internal representations of the environment. The environment considered as a
problem representation serves as an external memory capable of being perceptually accessed,
updates itself automatically and in parallel, serves as an external memory store, is internally
consistent, and is always veridical (also see Reitman, Nado, and Wilcox, 1978). The world takes
care of its own "truth maintenance."
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When uncertainties do occur using such an external representation (i.e., perceptually available
information underspecifies constraints on activity), these uncertainties can often be resolved
through perception-action rather than accessing stored knowledge. How well cooked is the
underside of a steak? Flip it and see. And the cook not only uses the structure already present in
the environment, he or she can dynamically create structure in order to make perception-action
solutions available and thereby reduce cognitive burdens. For example, the cook may organize the
placement of meats in order of doneness, may lay out dishes or plates to serve as a temporary
external memory of orders to be prepared (also see Beach, 1988), and may even generate new
information "displays" by introducing constraint in the controlled environment causing a hidden
variable to covary with a visible one. For example, the cook may adopt the strategy of continually
flipping meats so that the doneness of the top side can always be used as a reliable indicator of the
doneness of the underside. In a very real sense, the cook is both performer and on-line interface
designer.
Skilled human-environment interaction of this type is thus both a response to environmental
structure as well as a source of environmental structure to be subsequently exploited. The
environmental structure created by the cook's own "tricks" and routinized strategies plays a role
similar to the structure created through the environmental design process itself in promoting
cognitive efficiencies. The former structuring merely happens "on-line" and is thus short-lived,
while the latter happened during the design of the grill area and is thus reflected in the static and
permanent organization of the design. But both forms of structure, whether contributed at one
point in time by the designer or continually by the cook, result in cognitive economies through the
enablement of perception-action solutions to the task. For example, the external memories and
displays dynamically created by the cook play a similar cognitive role to the timing mechanisms
used in toasters and ovens to offload memory demands to the world. Because of the possibility of
self-produced environmental structure, the acquisition of such situated skills will always resist
faithful description solely in terms of the development of more efficient internal mechanisms for
processing a fixed set of environmental information. A model of skill acquisition in dynamic
human-environment interaction would also have to describe how the actor's external environment
becomes increasingly structured by activity itself, and thus increasingly informative to the actor,
over the course of skill development.
Much of the responsibility for dynamic human-environment interaction lies in the perception-
action mechanisms at the interface between the performer and the world. The development of
skilled, dynamic interaction relies upon abilities to exploit environmental structure to obtain
perception-action solutions to tasks, and where none naturally exist, to create additional
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environmental structure in such a way as to enable perception-action solutions. If such structure is
not provided by the designer, the performer will seek to create it through activity that introduces
new forms of structure. The productivity of this mode of behavior requires the availability of
sources of information to specify the environmental constraints to which behavior must be
sensitive in order to be effective, and the availability of actions capable of both changing the
environment and of creating additional sources of information to further enable the perceptual
guidance of activity. These are, I believe, features common to nearly all environments in which the
acquisition of fluent, dynamic interaction is observed. They are also features lacking in the many
technological environments of interest to cognitive engineering, due largely to interfaces that highly
restrict perception-action access to the controlled system. The absence of such features is one
major cause of the difficulty of acquiring skills in such systems, and the reason that the end state of
learning is often one of only partially effective adaptation.
TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The previous discussion has centered on identifying a number of necessary conditions for
psychological models to support environmental design. It is time now to turn toward outlining a
methodological strategy with the potential to address the some of the gaps in our knowledge
discussed above. Many of the necessary features for psychological models that have been
identified are suggestive of the possibility that an ecological approach to human-environment
interaction may yield fruitful tools for cognitive engineering. The ecological approach was
pioneered by Brunswik's (1952) and Gibson's (1966, 1979) theories of how knowledge of
environmental structure can provide important constraints on psychological explanations. In
particular, Brunswik's emphasis on taking the human-environment system as the unit of analysis
and modeling, perhaps best represented in the Lens model framework (Brunswik, 1952; 1956;
Hammond, 1955), and Gibson's focus on how fluent interaction can be described as perceptual
specification of environmental constraints on activity (1979), blend nicely with the claims that
cognitive engineering is most in need of models of skilled interaction with the world, and models
which take the human-environment system as the unit of analysis.
In the following I will take some initial steps toward identifying opportunities the ecological
approach might offer for cognitive modeling to support design. However, and for readers already
familiar with Gibson's views especially, it is important to first discuss what an ecological approach
to cognitive engineering does not require. First, it does not require that we conceive of all human-
environment interaction as purely perceptually guided activity. Direct perceptual guidance of
action, as discussed by Gibson, might surely be possible although it is likely that it is specific to
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those information-rich environments in which perception evolved or to artifactual environments
designed to mimic such environments. There is no reason to expect that evolution anticipated the
modern aircraft cockpit or the word processor. In such environments the need for post-perceptual
processes such as problem solving and decision making is quite likely. The ecological and
information processing approaches need not always be considered to be at odds, but may instead
both contribute to a more complete understanding of human-environment interaction.
Second, the adoption of an ecological approach does not necessarily imply a commitment to
studying fluent behavior in the natural environment Gibson rallied against the use of abstract
information displays for the study of visual perception; the types of displays often found in
existing human-machine systems. But in a larger sense, Gibson, like Brunswik before him, was
arguing for using environmental conditions as the basis of scientific study that are representative of
the conditions in which a target behavior of interest occurs. And for better or worse, a cockpit or
control room looks much more like a laboratory than it does the natural terrestrial environment.
These are the target environments of interest to the cognitive engineer. For this reason, these
environments, or carefully made abstractions of them, are the places where the ecological approach
to cognitive engineering should be carried out.
Resources for Cognitive Modeling
Brunswik (1952) offered the Lens model as a description of how the human and environment
could be described in an integrated fashion, using the principle of parallel concepts (e.g., see
Hammond, Steward, Brehmer, and Steinmann, 1975). As shown in Figure 1, the Lens model is a
symmetrical framework which represents how both environmental and cognitive structure mutually
contribute to judgment performance. The organism has available a set of cues (xj's) which bear
specified relations (re/s) to an environmental criterion to be judged (e.g., a medical diagnosis).
The relations between the the cues and the criterion may take various forms and vary in ecological
validity. Similarly, the ways in which the organism's makes use of the cues (rs>j's) to arrive at a
judgment may take various forms and vary in cue utilization. The framework is an expression of
the principle of parallel concepts in that each concept on one side of the model has a counterpart on
the other side. This framework has a number of attractive properties that result from representing
the organism and environment in compatible terms.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Perhaps most importantly, the Lens model framework allows the modeler to measure the degree
to which the environmental structure which relates the cues to the criterion is reflected in the
manner in which the cues are cognitively structured to produce a judgment High levels of
achievement are an indication of a highly adaptive cognitive organization; i.e., a cognitive strategy
that mirrors the environmental structure to which behavior must be sensitive. As many of the
previous comments in this chapter suggest, some sort of adaptivity-oriented view of cognitive
activity is likely to be required in order to understand skilled human-environment interaction as
well. In addition, the Lens model allows one to localize the causes of less than fully productive
behavior to either the environmental structure, the cognitive structure, or both. Weather forcasters,
for example, frequently err in their predictions, but only an analysis of both the ecological validity
of the cue structure and their policies for cue utilization can yield an understanding of the reasons
for these errors. We often have similar interests in the design and analysis of human-machine
systems. Did a particular error result from an operator making incorrect usage of displayed
information, or was the error the result of a potentially perfectly adapted operator confronted with
not fully diagnostic information? Quite different types of remedial action can (and should) result
depending upon the answers to questions such as these.
Thus, the Lens model framework offers a good starting point for developing an approach for
representing skilled human-environment interaction. However, my previous comments suggest
that we not only require models that take the human-environment system as the unit of analysis, we
also need models capable of representing fluent, skilled behavior in order to identify demands for
more complex cognitive activity. From this perspective, the Lens model has two important
deficiencies. First, action itself is not explicitly represented. The Lens model is a epistemological
framework for the purpose of modeling judgments about the state of the world, not to represent
how actions are selected. A first step toward applying the Lens model to action selection would be
to allow an action opportunity itself to serve as the criterion to be judged. However, this
interpretation can give rise to a number of conceptual difficulties, and we must be careful in how
we go about formulating this interpretation in order to keep distinct the environmental model (facts
about the world), and the cognitive model (facts about the performer). Second, as suggested by
Hammond et al. (1975), judgment is a "cognitive activity of last resort" (p. 272). Judgmental
abilities will only be called upon when the available information only probabilistically specifies the
criterion, and actions capable of manipulating environmental variables to gain more diagnostic
information are not available. Note that these environmental properties are exactly those features of
task environments I have previously described as being the major impediments to the development
of fluent, perceptually guided interaction. Like formalisms for rational action, then, it may be quite
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possible to interpret the skilled selection of action within the Lens model framework, however,
such a model is not likely to capture those special features of task environments that allow for the
acquistion effluent human-environment interaction.
The need to explicitly represent fluent interaction, as well as those features of the world that
promote it, suggest that we must consider the problem of how the environment of the skilled
performer should be described. Gibson, with his ecological physics and theory of affordances
(1979), proposed an action-oriented environmental description in order to understand how
perception may orient behavior to environmental opportunities for action. An action-oriented
approach results in a description of the environment in terms of the opportunities for action it
presents the performer. The resulting description can be called an affordance space, akin to the
decision space descriptions resulting from decision theory, the problem space descriptions
resulting from problem solving theory, or the cue space descriptions resulting from theories of
probabilistic judgment. In most cases, an affordance space will be a dynamic description of the
environment, as both the environmental structure and the performer's resources for action will
change over time and a dynamic affordance structure will result.
Note that creating an affordance space environmental description does not commit one to any
particular position concerning how affordances may be detected to guide activity. Gibson was
most concerned with those situations in which perceptual information is available to specify
affordances, and in such cases interaction can be described as the perceptual detection of
information capable of orienting behavior to action opportunities. However, in other situations
perception-action access to the environment may be restricted or impoverished, or information
other than that specifying the immediately present affordance structure must be taken into account
for behavior to be productive. In such cases, performers may have to engage in more elaborate
cognitive activity in order to detect the affordance structure, or to combine information specifying
affordances with other information in order to select actions. Regardless of the type of either
perceptual or post-perceptual activity required to orient behavior to an affordance structure, a
description of the world in terms of affordances is still a valuable tool in understanding how
environmental structure is reflected in cognition and behavior.
For our purposes, the concept of an affordance space is especially important because it provides
resources to compensate for the two deficiencies of the Lens model identified above. First, an
affordance space can in some cases play the role of the criterion in the Lens model, thus shifting
the emphasis from passive judgment to the identification and selection of opportunities for action.
Second, the possibility that perceptual information is capable of fully specifying the affordance
space (i.e., direct perception) suggests that we must relax the a priori assumption underlying the
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Lens model that the available information is only probabilistically related to the criterion. The
question of determining the relationship between the available information and the environmental
affordance structure is an empirical one. The ecological task analysis framework presented below
is an attempt to integrate Brunswik's Lens model and Gibson's affordance theory into a unified
framework for modeling skilled human-environment interaction.
The Framework for Ecological Task Analysis
Integrating concepts from Brunswik's Lens model and Gibson's affordance theory results in
the ecological task analysis framework depicted in Figure 2. Like the Lens model, the proposed
framework is a symmetrical arrangement which represents the integrated human-environment
system. Not only does ecological task analysis exploit the principle of parallel concepts to capture
certain symmetries between cognitive and environmental structure, the proposed framework also
uses a principle of parallel concepts to suggest certain symmetries between perception and action.
This latter symmetry is evident in the relationship between the upper model of environmental
perceptual structure, and the lower model of environmental action structure.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Ecological task analysis begins with the creation of two complementary descriptions of the
surface structure of the environment. As in the Lens model framework, we rely upon a distinction
between environmental surface structure which exists at the interface between the performer and
the world, and the environmental depth structure which exists remotely, behind the surface
structure, so to speak. The two descriptions of surface structure, shown in the middle of the
diagram, are models of environmental perceptual structure and environmental action structure. The
description of surface perceptual structure in ecological task analysis plays a similar role to the cue
description in the Lens model. The model of surface perceptual structure describes the
environmentally available information. In human-machine systems, one can think of surface
perceptual structure as the information available from interface displays about the state of the
controlled system. Unlike the Lens model framework which captures only the surface perceptual
structure of the environment, however, ecological task analysis also requires a description of the
surface action structure of the environment. In a human-machine system, one can think of surface
action structure as the actions made available by interface controls.
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In the Lens model framework, the relation between surface perceptual structure and depth
structure is the relation between the readily available information and the environmental state a
person is attempting to judge. Similarly, in the proposed framework the relation between surface
action structure and depth structure is the relation between the readily available actions and the
environmental change the person is attempting to effect. On the perceptual side, the surface/depth
distinction reflects the difference between given and inferred. On the action side, the surface/depth
distinction reflects the difference between readily available actions and intended actions. The
model of environmental depth structure on the left side of Figure 2 is a description of these
potentially covert relationships, and the model of cognitive structure on the right side of the figure
is a description of how environmental depth structure is reflected in cognition, and ultimately,
behavior.
The Principle of Parallel Concepts: Perceptual and Action Structure
The description of environmental surface structure in terms of both perception and action is
necessary to capture how the skilled perceptual guidance of activity is possible. The possibility for
perceptual guidance of activity relies upon the availability of perceptual information capable of fully
specifying environmental affordances. In terms of the proposed framework, perceptual guidance
of action is not to be described as the perceptual detection of surface information to infer some
covert or remote depth property of the environment. Rather, the perceptual guidance of action is to
be described as the use of one form of surface structure, namely perceptual, to specify another
form, namely, the surface action structure. As will be described in detail below, the ecological task
analysis process proceeds by examining the models of perceptual and action surface structure to
identify the congruence between these two forms of environmental description. Matches between
these two models indicate opporunities for fluent, perceptually guided activity. Mismatches
between these two models are indicative of demands for cognitive activity to overcome the
perceptual non-specification of action. Various forms of mismatch are possible: each form of
mismatch is suggestive of a different type of necessary cognitive activity, and a different type of
remedial interface design solution.
Before describing the analysis process, the symmetrical nature of the models of perceptual and
action structure must be discussed. The rr 'el of surface perceptual structure is an environmental
description using a performer s perceptual capacities as a frame of reference in which the
envirommental structure is described This description is relational in the sense that the resulting
environmental model reflects both the perceptual capacities of a performer and the environmental
structure. It is easy to overlook that such descriptions are actually relational in nature, as we often
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speak as if a perceptually-generated differentiation of the environment is purely a function of the
environmental structure and not a function of perceptual capacities. However, the fact that some
forms of environmental structure are seen as objects while others are not, or the fact that some
aspects of the environment are seen as being blue while others are red, are as much facts about the
perceptual system as they are of the environment. A perceptually-oriented environmental model is
a relational construct created by using perceptual capacities as a frame of reference in which
environmental structure is measured and described.
The second model of environmental surface structure required for ecological task analysis is an
action-oriented description of the environment The model of surface action structure is an
environmental description using a performer s action capacities as a frame of reference in which the
environmental structure is described. This description is relational in the sense that the resulting
environmental model reflects both the action capacities of a performer and the environmental
structure. This action-oriented environmental model represents the world in terms of its
opportunities for action. This environmental model thus generates a differentiation of the world in
terms of the degree to which various spatiotemporal environmental regions are consistent in
various degrees with the taking of various actions. An action-oriented environmental model is a
relational construct created by using action capacities as a frame of reference in which
environmental structure is measured and described.
The symmetrical nature of the perceptually-oriented and action-oriented environmental
descriptions required for ecological task analysis should be apparent. These two environmental
models differ only in that one is relativized to the functionality of the performer s input mechanisms
while the other is relativized to the functionality of the performer s output mechanisms. The two
models thus reflect two different primitive differentiations of the environment, one generated by
using perceptual capacities to understand how the world is carved up with respect to perception,
and the other generated by using action capacities to understand how the world is carved up with
respect to action. As Barwise and Perry (1983, p. 11) have suggested,
The emphasis is on how the organism differentiates its environment, on the sorts of
uniformities it recognizes across situations. Different organisms can rip the same
reality apart in different ways, ways that are appropriate to their own needs, their own
perceptual abilities and their own capacities for action. This interdependence between
the structure the environment displays to the organism and the structure of the organism
with respect to the environment is extremely important. For while reality is there,
independent of the organism s individuative activity, the structure it displays to an
organism reflects properties of the organism itself. (My emphasis)
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Neither the perceptually-oriented environmental description nor the action-oriented
environmental description results in a more primitive, privileged, or objective ontological picture of
the world. However, the claim is sometimes made that an action-oriented description of the world
in terms of affordances is scientifically illegitimate because it is relativized to the actor, and is thus
in some sense subjective. Note that the correct response to this possible criticism is not to adopt the
heroic position that affordances are in some sense independent of the performer: they are not, they
arise from using the performer s action capacities as a frame of reference for environmental
description. Rather, to counter this argument one must merely emphasize that the supposedly
scientifically legitimate perceptually-oriented environmental descriptions which portray a world of
objects and properties are just as relativized to the capacities of the performer as are action-oriented
environmental descriptions. One merely takes perceptual functionality as the frame of reference for
environmental description, while the other takes action functionality as the frame of reference.
The Process of Ecological Task Analysis
I shall call a process whereby environmental models of surface perceptual and action structure
are created and mismatches between the environmental differentiations represented in the two
models are identified and described, an ecological task analysis of a human-environment system.
What I believe to be the central contribution of an ecological approach to cognitive modeling can
now be stated quite simply. A preliminary ecological task analysis of a human-environment
system is required to identify the degree to which an interface (natural or artificial) between the
human and environment is consistent with the principles underlying fluent interaction, and by
doing so such an analysis helps specify what cognitive processes will be necessary for effective
behavior. An ecological task analysis is thus similar in spirit to Marr s (1982) computational-level
theory which attempts to define the necessary functionality of vision models, and Anderson s
(1990) rational analysis which attempts to define the necessary functionality of a variety of
cognitive models. Before outlining the analysis process, a few comments comparing the goals of
ecological task analysis and Anderson s approach in particular may be valuable.
The goal of ecological task analysis is to define the necessary functionality of any cognitive
processes that may be required to support effective human-environment interaction. Like
Anderson s rational analysis, then, the present approach leaves aside the question of how any
necessary cognitive activities might be carried out. In this much the two approaches share a
common perspective. However, ecological task analysis takes human-environment interaction to
be its primary concern, whereas the current formulation of rational analysis is concerned with
cognitive activities such as memory, categorization, and problem solving. But as Anderson
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himself has noted, all these cognitive abilities are useless if they do not in some way serve the goal
of action selection, and for Anderson, action selection is to always to be understood as the result of
a problem solving or decision making exercise (p. 192). Perhaps it doesn t much matter what
words Anderson uses to describe the processes underlying action selection, but what does matter is
the nature of the environmental models that result from such a choice (decision trees and problem
state spaces).
But as our previous comments suggest, all action selection, whether resulting from cognitively
intensive processes or from more efficient perception and action, can be rationalized into one of
these frameworks for explaining productive behavior. Modeling to support design, however, must
focus not on the sufficiency of these frameworks but rather on limiting the conditions of their
necessity. Ecological task analysis, therefore, starts not by assuming action selection is governed
in any particular manner, but rather has as one if its goals to define what sorts of governing
mechanisms will be necessary for modeling any instance of human-environment interaction.
Ecological task analysis attempts to meet this goal through the use of environmental models that
allow for a description of action selection in terms of the perceptual guidance of activity. Only
when an examination of these environmental models indicates mismatches in perception-action
environmental structure will ecological task analysis result in a construal of action selection in
terms of decision making, problem solving, or any other cognitively intensive activity.
The Principle of Parallel Concepts: Environmental Depth and Cognitive Structure
As mentioned above, ecological task analysis begins with the creation of the models of
perceptual surface structure and action surface structure which provide the bridge between the
human and the environment. The analysis process proceeds by then examining the congruence
between these two models in terms of the manner in which they differentiate the environment with
respect to perception and action. The process of examining congruence will be discussed in detail
below. The result of this exercise, however, is the specification of a model of the environmental
depth structure, and a complementary model of internal cognitive structure and process. It is very
important to note that ecological task analysis requires that modeling the environmental depth
structure comes after creating the models of perception and action structure. That is, we do not
begin by assuming that the task environment possesses a certain intrinsic depth structure (e.g.,
problem state space, decision tree, linear cue-criterion function), and thereby, a corresponding
structure to cognitive processes (e.g., heuristic search, comparative evaluation of alternatives,
linear cue combination rules). Rather, we let the examination of the surface perceptual and action
structure of the environment guide the selection of the model of depth structure, and thereby the
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corresponding structure for cognitive processes. Herein lies the major difference between the
proposed approach and many current modeling approaches in cognitive science: considerations of
perception-action functionality define the necessary functionality for cognitive processes, rather
than defining perception-action functionality by an a priori cognitive model of action selection.
I have tried to make the case for sequencing the analysis in this fashion at a variety of previous
points in this chapter. We are obviously looking for a model of environmental depth structure that
corresponds to, and helps make sense of, the cognitive activities that will actually be engaged to
serve action selection. Which cognitive activities will be necessary for productive behavior,
however, can only be determined by a detailed analysis of the degree to which perceptually
information is available to specify productive action. Different interface (control-display) designs
for the same task environment can differ radically in terms of the cognitive demands they make
upon the performer, with the result that the cognitive model that provides the best description of the
processes underlying interaction with one interface may be quite unlike the cognitive model that
best describes the processes underlying interaction with another interface. As a result, different
environmental models will be needed in the two cases to describe the different ways in which
environmental structure is reflected in cognition and behavior in the two cases. Note, however,
that like the Lens model framework, once a model of environmental depth structure and a
corresponding model of internal cognitive processes are selected, the congruence between the
environmental and cognitive models can be examined in order to identify any ways in which
cognitive limitations or biases place constraints upon productive behavior.
This is obviously a highly schematic description of the models necessary for ecological task
analysis. Yet I wonder if it is possible to get more precise about the content of these descriptions
without doing a potential injustice to the richness of the perceptual and action structure of any
realistically complex behavioral situation. One great allure of environmental models that rationalize
action selection as decision making or problem solving is that relatively low-dimensional
environmental descriptions can be used. Such low dimensional representations are advantageous
in that they can be easily applied across a variety of contexts and are thus suggestive of how the
psychological processes underlying action selection might be organized in a context-free, general
purpose format. Describing the world in terms of the interaction of raw environmental structure
with perceptual and action capacities, on the other hand, has the potential to create environmental
models of almost unlimited dimension. Nevertheless, my own view is that any method capable of
identifying the mechanisms underlying skilled human interaction in a setting of any reasonable
complexity requires models capable of preserving many of the fine details of the environmental
structure. The richness of the world s perceptual and action structure, seemingly necessary for the
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fluent operation of the perception-action system, severely overtaxes our highly limited cognitive-
linguistic resources for environmental description. I doubt that at the current time a task analysis
technique capable of guiding human-environment interaction modeling can possibly be much more
than a charge to the modeler to undertake the long and arduous process of identifying and
describing the potentially overwhelmingly rich interface between the performer and the world.
For this reason, the following description of the analysis process will consist of an abstract
discussion of the possible results of an ecological task analysis, along with a concrete example of
how such an analysis can be performed for a particular behavioral situation. Figure 3 depicts four
possible results of an ecological task analysis in terms of the congruence of the resulting
perceptually-oriented and action-oriented environmental models. The grid lines in each of the
schematic environmental models indicate the manner in which the environment is spatiotemporally
differentiated with respect to either perceptual capacities or action capacities. The four cases will be
described separately.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Case I: Perceptual overspecification of action
In the first case shown in Figure 3, the perceived environment is over-differentiated with
respect to the environmental differentiation in terms of opportunities for productive action. Many
different perceptually distinct situations all point to a single opportunity for productive action.
Object or configural displays are one type of design solution available for coping with perceptual
overspecification of action. Object displays are an attempt to reduce the dimensionality of the
perceptual space so it becomes aligned with the lower dimensional action space. These displays
perform this function by organizing the originally over-differentiated perceptual information in
such a way that perceptually salient relational features emerge that are differentiated in a manner
identical to the differentiation reflected in the action space. When a display based solution is not
used, however, the performer will have to develop some ability to overcome perceptual
overspecification. Perceptual pattern recognition is one process that could potentially result in an
alignment of the perception and action spaces, although some naturally occurring relational
properties must be perceptually available to enable this solution. When the possibility for pattern
recognition is neither naturally supported nor supported through configural display design, it is
likely that a significant amount of categorical or instance-based learning may be required in order to
identify consistencies in the mapping from perception to action. Note, however, that there is still
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the possibility of fully productive performance in all these cases since perception merely over-
specifies action, it does not misspecify action, as in Case IV below.
Case II: Perceptual underspecification of action
Here the perceived environment is underdifferentiated with respect to the environmental
differentiation in terms of productive action. There is simply not enough perceptually available
information in order to uniquely specify the appropriate action alternative. One likely cause of
perceptual underspecification of action is that there is hidden-state information in the environment;
i.e., the performer must know something about the previous history of the environment, keep this
information in memory, and then integrate this memorial information with the perceptual
information in order to uniquely specify the appropriate action alternative. Building memory into
the displayed interface using trend or historical displays is one strategy for aiding performance in
such cases. Another cause of perceptual underspecification is that information about future state,
rather than past state, is not perceptually available. Perception identifies a number of action
candidates, but the selection of the appropriate action requires knowledge of the downstream
effects of an action, and these effects are not perceptually apparent. Predictor displays or fast-time
simulations are two approaches for making this information available to the performer. Unaided
performance, however, will require considerable learning before skill can be acquired.
Internalization of environmental dynamics in the form of an internal model may be necessary in
order to gain access to past or future state information. The problem solving models of Newell and
Simon can be viewed as descriptions of the cognitive activities that may be necessary when the
downstream effects of an action must be taken into consideration. Exploratory behavior, or
physically trying out solutions is a method available for taking into account information about
future state without the use of an internal model, although this form of activity may not always be
possible. A form of perceptual learning that is available to overcome initial perceptual
underspecification is perceptual differentiation (e.g., EJ. Gibson, 1969). Here, the perceptual
capacities of the performer change in order to increase the dimensionality of the perceptual space so
as to bring the perceptual differentiation of the environment into alignment with the action-oriented
environmental differentiation. Perceptual learning of this type, however, requires (perhaps initially
subtle) dimensions of stimulation to which perception can eventually become sensitive.
Case HI: Perceptual specification of action
In this situation fluent performance can be expected to develop without significant cognitive
demands or conceptual learning. The performer s pre-established perceptual competencies provide
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the ability for unique specification of productive action. No rule-based information integration is
required. Neither is information about the history or future of the environment necessary.
Therefore, no internalization of environmental dynamics is required to provide these forms of
information. If it were the case that the designer could always be certain that the perceptually-
oriented and action-oriented environmental models of the human-environment system were correct,
interfaces that support the perceptual specification of action would be our undeniable design target.
However, if unanticipated changes occur in either the diagnosticity of the displayed information,
the functionality of the interface controls, or the environmental dynamics, a fluent, informationally
encapsulated perception-action mode of control may carry on without the performer paying heed to
these environmental disturbances.
Case IV: Perceptual misspecificarion of action
In the final case the mapping between the perceptually available information and productive
action is unruly. Behavior might well be productive in this situation, but not because the currently
perceived situation is particularly informative. Models of behavior in such situations typically
endow the performer with a considerable amount of knowledge to overcome perceptual
misspecification, or else give up hope for a deterministic account of action selection and instead opt
for finding invariance in aggregate performance through the construction of probabilistic cognitive
and environmental models. In fact, the Lens model of human judgement can be considered to be a
special case of the ecological task analysis framework under the assumptions that perception
missspecifies action (judgment), and that the environmental depth structure can be described with
cue-cue and cue-criterion correlations indicating the covert relationships among these variables. I
will have little to say about this case because, frankly, it is something of a catch-all. However, I
do think it is important to emphasize that when the modeler finds what appears to be a case of
perceptual misspecification, but yet observes productive action selection based upon perceptual
information, it is likely that the performer knows some things that the modeler does not. I suspect
that such cases are more frequent than we may care to admit. The long history of findings on the
context-sensitivity of reasoning (e.g., Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972; Johnson-Laird, 1975),
decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and problem
solving (Kotovsky, Hayes and Simon, 1985) all demonstrate that people pay considerably more
attention to the concrete presentation of a problem situation than do many abstract cognitive
models. There is, of course, really no environmental stuff that is context as opposed to relevant
structure. Context is always defined with respect to a model; it is simply those aspects of the
environment that a given model fails to represent, and as a result, those aspects that are rendered
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incapable of producing behavioral variance. Findings which demonstrate the intensive context-
sensitivity of cognition and behavior can be seen to be, in part, a reflection of the fact that many
current environmental models are either overly abstract, or perhaps even cut across the grain of the
perceptually-oriented and action-oriented environmental differentiations that are the basis of
ecological task analysis. I suspect that in some cases the apparently unruly mappings that give rise
to complex or probabilistic accounts of cognition can be straightened out as much by increased
attention to environmental modeling as by increasingly elaborate cognitive modeling.
An Example of Ecological Task Analysis
We have performed modeling of human-environment interaction in a dynamic micro-world in
order to advance approaches that could provide resources for interface design (Kirlik, Miller and
Jagacinski,-1991). At a concrete level, the experimental apparatus consisted of rich, graphically
displayed sources of information and a mixture of both continuous and discrete controls, similar to
the kind of interface technology typical of many modern human-machine systems. At an abstract
level, the task required subjects to engage in both manual control and supervisory control
(Sheridan, 1987) of a set of semi-autonomous craft operating in a simulated world. The selection
of a supervisory control task, in which a system operator is responsible for planning and
implementing activities for (often remote) automated systems, was motivated by the introduction of
automation in many existing systems and the need to design interfaces to support this form of
interaction.
The experimental apparatus simulated the cockpit of a scout vehicle, over which subjects could
use manual (joystick) or automatic (autopilot) control. Crews used a supervisory mode of control
over four additional craft by entering strings of action commands using a text editor specifically
designed for the experiment. Subjects piloted the scout within the partially forested world shown
upon a dynamic, color graphical map or situation display showing the entire 100-square mile area
to which activity was confined. The scout s major activity was to discover hidden objects (cargo
and enemy craft) within the world. The scout was therefore equipped with a 1.5 mile radius radar
for this purpose. Subjects used the additional craft primarily to act upon the discovered objects,
i.e., to engage both stationary and mobile enemy craft and to load cargo and unload it at a home
base. Subjects also had to attend to a number of resource management constraints (e.g., fuel,
missiles, cargo capacity) in order to successfully complete each 30 minute experimental session.
The task was quite complex and many hours of practice were required to achieve mastery.
However, at skilled levels of performance the selection of action was quite rapid and a fluent and
often seamless mode of dynamic interaction characteristic of much skilled behavior was observed.
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The apparent economy of behavior in this environment led to the hypothesis that subjects were
relying heavily upon the rich set of graphical information as an external problem representation,
with some of the attendant advantages of this processing mode as discussed above in-relation to
our example of the short-order cook. However, it seemed unlikely that a perception-action mode
of control was possible in all cases, since some of the constraints upon productive action were not
easily identifiable from the displayed information, and actions were not always available to resolve
uncertainties associated with non-specific perceptual information. An ecological task analysis of
this human-environment system was performed in order to identify situations where the control-
display interface supported a perception-action processing mode, as well as those situations in
which the interface design may have required subjects to use a more cognitively intensive mode of
action selection. The results of the task analysis were used to motivate the design of a process
model capable of successfully mimicking subject behavior.
An ecological task analysis of search behavior
The present example concerns modeling the selection of continuous search paths for the scout
through the simulated world. A more complete description of this model as well as a description of
environmental and cognitive modeling for dynamic discrete action selection in the laboratory task
can be found in Kirlik, Miller, and Jagacinski (1991). Figure 4 is a depiction of a world
configuration as it was displayed to subjects. The open regions, here indicated in white, were
displayed in light brown. The lightly forested and heavily forested regions, here shown as light
gray and dark gray, were displayed as light green and dark green, respectively. Only home base
(the unfilled circle) and the initial location of the scout are shown in the figure.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Searching the world for cargo and enemy craft requires consideration of two capacities for
action: scout locomotion and sighting objects with scout radar. Locomotion was most efficiently
performed in open rather than forested regions due to the need to navigate around trees. Sighting
objects, on the other hand, was more efficiently performed in lightly forested areas because objects
were considered to be more densely located in forests. In addition, the fuel range constraints
influenced search path selection since fuel expenditure rates were designed so the scout had to
refuel at home base at some point during the middle third of the experimental session.
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Insert Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 shows search paths created by two different subjects. Both begin by traveling north
along the boundary of the inner forest, turn east to follow the top boundary of this forest, loop
back west along the boundary of the upper forest, turn south along the border of the left forest,
visit home base for refueling, then depart to the east and then the north, at which point the session
terminated. This boundary hugging behavior resulted from the interaction of the two major criteria
for search path selection: searching forests with the 1.5 mile radar to discover objects, and
locomoting through open terrain to cover as much area as possible.
What is the most faithful description of the cognitive activities underlying search behavior?
What is an appropriate model for the depth structure of this environment? We of course would like
to find a model of depth structure that captures those environmental features to which cognition and
behavior was sensitive. One could of course formulate this process as a constrained optimization
problem and use a generate-and-test procedure to create alternative paths and then evaluate them
with respect to an objective function. However, there are an infinite number of possible paths and
the computational demands appear overwhelming. One could also attempt to describe this process
in rule-based terms, using an environmental description in terms of perceptually salient objects
such as forests and their borders. With this model, the cognitive processes underlying search
behavior would be described in terms of the manipulation of symbols standing for discrete aspects
of environmental structure.
Ecological task analysis, on the other hand, suggests that we delay assumptions about modeling
environmental depth structure and cognitive processes until after the models of environmental
perceptual structure and action structure have been constructed. An initial cut at constructing the
perceptually-oriented environmental model required for ecological task analysis would be to
describe the objects and properties perceptually apparent on this map display. However, as will be
seen below, ecological task analysis suggests that we iterate and refine this initial perceptually-
oriented model after constructing the action-oriented model by using the latter to help identify any
initially overlooked perceptual information capable of specifying the action-oriented structure of
this world. The information used as the basis for action selection may be considerably more subtle
and rich than the information preserved when using perception in a purely descriptive capacity
(e.g., Neisser, 1988; Bridgeman, 1991; Shebilske, 1991).
Constructing the action-oriented environmental model requires the use of action capacities as a
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frame of reference for environmental description. Since two action capacities underlie search
behavior (locomotion and sighting objects with radar), we must describe the action-oriented
structure, or affordances, of this environment for both locomotion and sighting objects. We will
consider search affordances to be a simple combination of the locomotion and sighting
affordances. Figure 6 shows the distribution of locomoting, sighting, and searching affordances
as maps of the world in which the paths show in Figure 5 were generated. Figure 6a shows the
world as it appeared on the map display. Figure 6b shows the locomoting affordance, calculated
by assigning a value of zero for open regions, a value of -1.5 to lightly forested regions, and a
value of -2.0 to heavily forested regions. These values were assigned to reflect the difficulty of
rapidly flying the scout through these regions differing in tree density. Darker regions on the maps
indicate higher affordance values.
Insert Figure 6 about here
The affordance values were selected by attempting to construct an objective measure of the
degree to which relevant actions could be performed as a function of environmental structure. For
example, Figure 6c shows the world sighting affordance structure. To construct this map, a four
dimensional vector was associated with each world location to indicate the percentage of area that
would be covered by scout radar centered at that location that was open region, lightly forested
region, heavily forested region, and area beyond the world boundaries. For each point, the inner
product of this vector and a sighting affordance vector was taken to determine the sighting
affordance of a particular world location. The sighting affordance vector was the same for each
world location and indicated the density of cargo and enemy craft within each of the four types of
regions. The sighting affordance vector had a value of zero for open regions and area beyond
world boundaries, and a value of 1.0 for lightly and heavily forested regions. A maximal sighting
affordance would exist, therefore, in cases where the entire scout radar range covered a forested
region, and a minimal sighting affordance would exist when the entire scout radar range covered
either an open region or area beyond the world boundary. The graded structure of the sighing
affordance distribution results from the complex interaction between the circular radar capabilities
of the scout and the irregularly shaped open and forested regions that determined object density, or
more generally, the interaction between the subjects action capacities and the environmental
structure.
Figure 6d shows the search affordance structure, created by simply summing the values of the
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locomoting and sighting affordances at each world location (i.e., a location affords search if it
affords both locomoting and sighting objects). This map has been rescaled to clearly indicate local
optima in the search affordance structure. Considered three dimensionally, this map indicates
peaks and ridges of high search affordance and valleys and holes of low searching affordance. The
peak areas indicate the best compromise between the conflicting demands for locomotion through
open regions and sighing objects in forested regions.
In order to define opportunities for fluent perception-actions solutions to this task, and also to
define models of environmental depth structure and cognitive process, we now examine the
congruence between the perceptually-oriented and action-orient, d environmental models. Note that
our original perceptually-oriented model differentiates the world differently than does the action-
oriented model. The two models are apparently out of alignment. We now ask the question,
however, what information contained within the perceptually-oriented model is available to specify
the action-oriented structure, or affordances, in this the world? Using knowledge of human
perceptual capacities together with knowledge of the displayed environmental structure, we attempt
to find a way in which perception could possibly measure the displayed world in a manner that
specifies the depth structure to the most faithful extent possible. What perceptual information
would be necessary to specify the search affordance structure?
First, note that the perceptually-oriented model differentiates the world in an isomorphic manner
to the differentiation provided by locomotion affordances. If perception can identify whether a
given location is open region, light forest, or heavy forest, then information is perceptually
available to fully specify locomotion affordances. To fully specify search affordances, however,
perception would also have to be able to measure the sighting affordance structure. Given the
manner in which sighting affordances were constructed we can define the nature of the necessary
perceptual information in this case. Specifically, when foveating at a particular world location,
perception would have to supply a measure of the amount of forested area within a circular area
defined by the 1.5 mile radar radius of the scout. Although psychophysical experiments are surely
needed to assess the degree to which this is possible (and could be straightforwardly conducted),
here I will simply assume that such perceptual judgments are possible, although we may expect
certain forms of systematic measurement errors. The result of such experiments would be an
empirically-based perceptually-oriented model of the world that indicates the information available
to specify the search affordances structure. Constructing the action-oriented environmental model,
however, was necessary to first identify what kinds of psychophysical experiments to conduct.
Let us assume for the sake of this exercise that the results of such experiments suggested that
people did have the perceptual ability to specify the search affordance structure. (If results indicated
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the subjects could not reliably estimate the search affordance structure we would then be able to
define the kinds of cognitive activities necessary to do so for behavior to be productive, i.e., to be
in alignment with search affordances). What would search behavior look like if subjects were
simply allowing search behavior to be governed by the perceptually detected search affordances?
We would perhaps expect in this case that the scout would be flown up the steepest gradient in the
search affordance structure from its present position. But while the local organization in search
paths may be describable in this fashion, search paths also have a global organization that is not
well captured by this simple search model.
This mismatch between observed behavior and the behavior that would result from a simple
perception-action solution to this task is suggestive of what kinds of additional cognitive demands
this task makes upon the performer. We construe long-range or global path planning as the
selection of a sequence of waypoints to be visited, where each waypoint is a peak or ridge in the
search affordance structure. We still can, however, construe short-range or local navigation in
terms of the simple perception-action model discussed above that results in search affordance
gradient ascent. The selection of an appropriate sequence of waypoints is constrained the need to
avoid backtracking through previously searched regions, and also the need to return to home base
at some point in the middle third of the mission. There is no readily available perceptual
information capable of specifying these constraints upon productive activity. Thus, we have a case
of perceptual underspecification of action, where the subject must apparently try out a number of
alternative solutions to assess the downstream effects (i.e., consistency with backtracking and fuel
constraints) of each, prior to selecting a global search path.
Insert Figure 7 about here
The resulting model is shown in Figure 7. At the start of a session, the model identifies the
peak areas in the search affordance map as candidate waypoints to visit during a mission. These
peak areas were submitted to a generate-and-test mechanism that attempted to order the waypoints
to acceptably meet backtracking and fuel constraints. Note that although a cognitively intensive
process is needed for this purpose, a relatively small number of waypoints are considered, since
the search affordance structure can be used to obtain a relatively low-dimensional representation of
the world for long-range path planning (i.e., the set of local optima). Many of the fine details of
local search affordance structure can be ignored during this process. The output of this process is
an ordered sequence of waypoints. The first waypoint is then selected as a destination and was
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thus considered to possess an affordance for visiting. The scout did not fly in a linear path to the
waypoint, however, since scout motion was determined not only by the visiting affordance but
also by the local search affordance structure in the vicinity of the scout Detailed motion
commands for the scout were created by considering the perceptually-measurable search affordance
structure to operate upon the scout as an attractive force field, which when combined with the a
force exerted by the visiting affordance of the current waypoint, determined the direction of motion
on a second by second basis. Large weights on the local search affordance values relative to the
weighting on the visiting affordance provided by the current waypoint resulting in meandering
motion that was very sensitive to search affordance structure. In contrast, a large weight on the
visiting affordance relative to the local search affordances resulted in a direct path to the current
waypoint which largely disregarded the local search affordance structure. This search model was
one component in a complete process model of skilled human-environment interaction in the
laboratory task. An evaluation of the empirical adequacy of the process model can be found in
Kirlik, Miller, and Jagacinski (1991).
CONCLUSION
I have tried to make the case that modeling to support design requires theories which take the
integrated human-environment system as the unit of analysis. Ecological task analysis is offered as
a framework in which the search for the mechanisms underlying human-environment interaction
can be carried out It is quite clear that much work remains to be done in order to flesh out the
details of ecological task analysis. The proposed framework is in no way a new theory of
cognition, although it may be considered to be a theory of the more global phenomenon of human-
environment interaction. As such, it does not contribute any new models of cognitive processes or
behavior, but rather, it guides the process of modeling any particular instance of interaction,
relying upon the perception-action and cognitive models the scientist may already have available.
In addition, ecological task analysis provides resources for design. For an already existing design
concept, it assists in the identification of cognitive demands through the process of identifying
match and mismatch in perception-action environmental structure. The results of such an analysis
can then specify the design of displays and controls that bring perception and action structure into
better alignment.
Modeling skilled human-environment interaction that relies upon the intensive exploitation of
environmental structure promises to be a messy business. We are led to this conclusion once we
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accept the possibility that the ability to skillfully perform within such a wide range of environments
is a testimony to our adaptive abilities, rather than testimony to any abstract, context-free, general-
purpose methods we may have for the selection of action. Perhaps we only resort to general-
purpose methods for action selection when we fail to find (or adjust the environment to allow)
more efficient perception-action solutions which are enabled by exploiting many of the concrete
details of the perception and action structures of our world. The search for models of skilled
interaction should not be mislead by the fact that what people can do most efficiently may be
hardest to describe, and what we do most inefficiently may be easiest to describe.
Throughout this chapter I have admittedly taken a cavalier attitude with respect to a number of
detailed psychological issues. This is not because I do not think such issues are important, but
rather because it is all too easy (for me, at least) to get so enamored with psychological minutiae
that the forest is lost for the trees. Thus, the emphasis has been on the issue how we will know a
cognitive model capable of guiding environmental design when we see one. In order to take some
positive steps in this direction, I have had to point out the deficiences of variety of existing
modeling approaches in cognitive science. I have not done this out of lack of respect for such
research. It is simply the case that the constraints that guide modeling in normal scientific practice
are quite different than the constraints that must guide modeling to support design. Constraints
give rise to problem decompositions, problem decompositions give rise to sets of solutions, and
these solutions give rise to new problems when we aim for theoretical integration, as we must to
support design. I quite expect that someone else will come along and criticize my own proposals
for decomposing the cognitive modeling problem. Perhaps the social structures and physiological
stressors operative in human machine systems cannot be so easily cleaved from the cognitive
factors as many of us normally assume. If the failure to describe the role of such factors is a major
impediment to design, we should welcome these criticisms of our theories as well.
Those with concrete design experience may claim that I have done for the design process what I
have tried to guard against in the modeling process: over-rationalization of behavior. Current
design practice is in many cases a far cry from the explicit problem solving search over
environmental models I have portrayed. However, much of the chaos of the design process may
be due to the lack of a sound theoretical basis. One must be on guard against proposing design
aiding strategies that are too tightly linked to current design activity lest one run the risk of treating
the symptoms rather than the cause. Obviously I believe that treating the cause requires an explicit
statement of the kinds of psychological models necessary to support cognitive engineering. The
design community must police its own research, for no one is likely to produce readily applicable
models unless that is the explicit goal.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The Lens model of Brunswik.
Figure 2. The Ecological task analysis framework. Like the Lens model framework for human
judgment, the ecological task analysis framework represents the integrated human-environment
system in a symmetrical arrangement. Matches between the perceptually-oriented and action-
oriented environmental differentiations indicate opportunities for the fluent perceptual guidance of
activity. Structural mismatches between the models of surface perceptual structure and surface
action structure are indicative of demands for cognitive activity, and corresponding models of the
environmental depth structure.
Figure 3. Four possible results of an ecological task analysis. Each case reflects a different type
of match or mismatch in environmental perception and action strucuture, and is thus indicative of a
different form of cognitive demands, and a different type of remedial interface design solution.
Figure 4. Map display showing home base, the scout, and forested areas.
Figure 5. Search paths produced by two different subjects in the same world configuration.
Figure 6. Four representations of the same world, (a) Displayed representation, (b) Locomotion
affordance representation, (c) Sighting affordance representation, (d) Search affordance
representation scaled to emphasize local optima in the affordance structure.
Figure 7. Process model of search path generation. Local optima in the search affordance
structure are organized into a series of waypoints via a generate-and-test scheduler. Detailed scout
motion is produced by a combination of attractive forces from both the current waypoint and the
local search affordance structure in the vicinity of the scout.
